Benbow пишет:
Сражение при Уэссане 1778 г., обычно упоминаемое вскользь историками по причине отсутствия потерь (обычная обывательская точка зрения), интересно тем, что французы, имевшие меньшие силы, искусно маневрировали и не позволили англичанам использовать их преимущества, при этом они могли добиться и большего успеха.
Ниже – описание у Clowes, III (Штенцель использовал его схемы):
The Brest fleet also put to sea, the day before Keppel, under the
command of Admiral the Comte d'Orvilliers. It contained thirty-
two ships of the line. Of these, three a sixty-four, a sixty, and a
fifty were not considered fit for the line of battle, which was thus
reduced to twenty-nine sail, carrying 2,098 guns. To these the
British opposed an aggregate of 2,278 ; but comparison by this means
only is very rough. Not only the sizes of the guns, but the classes
and weight of the vessels need to be considered. In the particular
instance the matter is of little importance ; the action being inde-
cisive, and credit depending upon mameuvres rather than upon
fighting. (Накануне сражения 2 фр. ЛК разминулись с флотом, и у Орвилье осталось 27 ЛК в линии + 3 слабых (с 18ф пушками на гон-деке) за линией.
The French admiral was hampered by vacillating instructions,
reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry.
Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that lie must avoid action,
unless under very favourable circumstances. At the moment of
sailing he wrote;: "Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, I
will not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless bv positive orders, until
I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instructions, and
known to all the captains. Till then I will not llv before Admiral
Keppel, whatever his strength ; only, if ! know him to be too
superior, I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can; but
if the enemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to -him."
These words explain his conduct throughout the next few days.
On the afternoon of July 2nd the two fleets sighted each other,
about a hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to
leeward. Towards sunset, the latter were standing south-west, with
the wind at west-north-west, and bore north-east from the British,
who were lying-to, heads to the northward. The latter remaining
nearly motionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting,
d'Orvilliers availed himself of the conditions to press to windward,
and in the morning was found to bear north-west from his opponent. 1
Their relative positions satisfied for the moment both admirals;
for Keppel found himself interposed between Brest and the French,
while d'Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open
retreat to his port, had made it possible, by getting the weather-gage,
to fulfil his promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of
his ships, however, the Due de Bourgogne, 80, and a seventy-four,
were still to leeward, not only of their own main body, but also of
the British. Keppel sent chasers after them, for the expressed pur-
pose of compelling d'Orvilliers to action in their support, 1 and it was
believed by the British that they were forced to return to Brest, to
avoid being cut off. They certainly quitted their fleet, which was
thus reduced to twenty-seven effective sail. From this time until
July 27th the wind continued to the westward, and the wariness of
the French admiral baffled all Keppel's efforts to get within range.
The latter, having no doubts as to what was expected of him, pur-
sued vigorously, watching his chance.
On the morning of the 27th the two fleets were from six to ten
miles apart, wind west-south-west, both on the port tack, steering
north-west, the French dead to windward. The latter were in line
ahead, the British in bow-and-quarter line ; that is, nearly abreast
each other, but so ranged that, it' they went about together, they
should have been in line ahead. Moth fleets were irregularly formed,
the British especially so; for Keppel rightly considered that he
would not accomplish his purpose, it' he were pedantic concerning
the order of his going. He had therefore signalled a "General
Chase," which, bv permitting much individual freedom of movement,
facilitated the progress of the whole. At daylight, the division com-
manded by Sir Hugh Palliser the right wing, as then heading -
had dropped astern ; and at f>.30 A. M. the signal was made to seven
of its fastest sailors to chase to windward, the object being so to
place them, relatively to the main body, as to support the latter, if
an opportunity for action should offer.
At l A. M. the French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy
and to see more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession. to
countermarch. As the van ships went round under this signal, they
had to steer off the wind, parallel to their former line, on which
those following them still were, until they reached the rear ship,
when they could again haul to the wind. This caused a loss of
ground to leeward, but not more than d'Orvilliers could afford, as
things stood. Just after he had fairly committed himself to the
maneuuvre, the wind hauled to the southward two points, 2 which
favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards the
enemy. Keppel therefore continued on the port tack, until all the
French were on the starboard, and at 10.15, being nearly in their
wake, he ordered his own ships to tack together. At this moment a
thick rain-squall came up, concealing the fleets one from another for
three quarters of an hour. With the squall the wind shifted back,
favouring the British on this tack, as it had on the other, and en-
abling them to lay up for the enemy's rear. When the weather cleared,
at 11, the French were seen to have gone about again, and were still
in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre. Their admiral had
doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and from the direction
of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter could not be
avoided. If lie continued on the starboard tack, the van of the
pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be misun-
derstood, would overtake his ships, engaging as many of them
as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the
columns would meet, and the Heels pass in opposite directions, on
equal terms as regarded position. Therefore he had ordered his
ships to go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again
rapidly, but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.
Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did
he now. Recognising that his enemy was avoiding action, he judged correctly that lie should force it, even at some risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade.
Besides, thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to
chase, these, forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he
was advancing, were now well to windward, able therefore to sup-
port their comrades, if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In
short, practically the whole force was coming into action, although
much less regularly than might have been desired. What was to
follow was a rough-and-ready fight, but it was all that could be had,
and better than nothing. Keppel therefore simply made the signal
for battle, and that just as the firing began. The collision was so
sudden that the ships at first had not their colours flying.
The French also, although their maneuvres had been more
methodical, were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of
thirty ships, of varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement
in a fortnight of sea practice. The change of wind had precipitated
f.n action, which one admiral had been seeking, and the other shun-
ning; but each had to meet it with such shift as he could. The
British being close-hauled, the French, advancing on a parallel line,
were four points l off the wind. Most of their ships, therefore, could
have gone clear to windward of their opponents, but the fact that
the latter could reach some of the leaders compelled the others to
support them. As d'Orvilliers had said, it was hard to avoid an
enemy resolute to fight. The leading three French vessels l hauled
their wind, in obedience to the admiral's signal to form the line of
battle, which means a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to
draw them gradually away from the British, and, if imitated by their
followers, to render the affair a mere touch at a single point inde-
cisive. The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire soon
after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by under
short canvas, firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily much
handicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy,
and caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside.
" The distance between the Formidable, 90, and the Egmont, 74, was
so short," testified Captain John Laforey, whose three-decker, the
Ocean, 90, was abreast and outside this interval, " that it was witli
difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage, without firing upon
them, and I was once very near on board the Egmont." The Formid-
able, Palliser's flagship, kept her mizzen topsail aback much of the
time, to deaden her way, to make room for the Ocean, and to allow
the ships behind her to close. "At a quarter past one," testified
Captain Maitland of the Elizabeth, 74, " we were very close behind
the Formidable, and a midshipman upon the poop called out that there
was a ship coming on board on the weather bow. I put the helm
up, . . . and found, when the smoke cleared away, I was shot up
under the Formidable & lee. She was then engaged with the two
last ships in the French fleet, and, as I could not fire at them without firing through the Formidable, I was obliged to shoot on." ! Captain Bazely, of the Formidable, says of the same incident, "The Formidable” did at the time of action bear up to one of the enemy's ships, to avoid being aboard of her, whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the Formidable. I thought we could not
avoid being on board."
Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in
killed and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of
1 Chevalier says, p. 89, " The English passed out of range " of these ships. As these ships had the wind, they had the choice of range, barring signals from their
own admiral. In truth, they were obeying his order.
2 This evidence of the captains of the Ocean and the Elizabeth contradicts Palliser's
charge that his ship was not adequately supported.
the other two. 1 This was due to the morning signal to chase to
windward, which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As
soon as the British van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its
commander, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, anticipating Keppel's
wishes, signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 1, V).
As the French column was running free, these ships, when about,
fetched to windward of its wake. As the Victory drew out of the
fire, at 1 P.M., Keppel made a similar signal, and attempted to wear,
the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking ; but caution was
needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it
was not till 2 P.M., that the Victory was about on the other tack,
heading after the French. At this time, 2 P.M., just before or just
after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down, and that for
1 It was actually quite equal, but this was due to an accidental explosion on
board the Fnrmiilnble.
the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latter was to
re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly because no
longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict the urgent
call for a re-formation. 1
At this time six or seven of Harland's division were on the
weather bow of the Victory, to windward (westward), but a little
ahead, and standing like her after the French ; all on the port tack
(Fig. 1). None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flag-
ship at once (Fig. 1, C). At 2.80 Palliser's ship, the Formidable,
on the starboard tack passed her to leeward, the last of the fleet
apparently out of action (Fig. 1, R). A half-hour after this the
Victory had been joined by three of the centre, which were following
her in close order, the van remaining in the same relative position.
Astern of these two groups were a number of other ships in various
degrees of confusion, some going about, some trying to come up,
others completely disabled. Especially, there was in the south-south-
east, therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or five British vessels,
evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring.
This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral,
scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of the
British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through
the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated
in the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of a
military exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped.
The French, starting from a better formation, had come out in better
shape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the dis-
advantage of a policy essentially defensive ; and d'Orvilliers' next
order, though well conceived, was resultless. At 1 P.M. J he sig-
nalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle on
the starboard tack (Fig. 1, F). This signal was not seen by the
leading ship, which should have begun the movement. The junior
French admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went
about, and spoke the Bretagne, to know what was the commander-
in-chief's desire. D'Orvilliers explained that he wished to pass along
the enemy's fleet from end to end, to leeward, because in its dis-
ordered state there was a fair promise of advantage, and by going
to leeward presenting his weather side to the enemy he could
use the weather lower-deck guns, whereas, in the then state of the
sea, the let' ports could not be opened. Thus explained, the move-
ment was executed, but the favourable moment had passed. It was
not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre was evident to the British.
As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent's intention, he wore
the Victory again, a few minutes after 3 P.M., and stood slowly
down, on the starboard tack off the wind, towards his crippled ships
in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of battle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station (Fig. 2, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy, Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight, a preposterous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at once and joined the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the Victory, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell in behind her, to
cover the rear until Palliser's division could repair damage and take
their places. At 4 P.M. Harland's division was in the line. Palli-
ser's ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves in rear
of the Formidable, their captains considering, as they testified, that
they took station from their divisional commander, and not from
the ship of the commander-in-chief. There was formed thus, on the
weather quarter of the Victory, and a mile or two distant, a separate
line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear of the fleet,
and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig. 2, R). At
5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten into
the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the
French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not at-
tacked, as they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee
of the British, their van abreast the latter's centre. At the same
time Harland was directed to move to his proper position in the van,
which he at once did (Fig. 2, V). Palliser made no movement, and
Keppel with extraordinary if not culpable forbearance, refrained
from summoning the rear ships into line by their individual pennants.
This he at last did about 7 P.M., signalling specifically to each of the vessels then grouped with Palliser (except the Formidable), to leave the latter and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly done, but it was thought then to be too late to renew the action.
At daylight the next morning, only three French ships were in sight
from the decks ; but the main body could be seen in the south-east
from some of the mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to
twenty miles distant.
Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish ;
the British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the
French 161 killed and 513 wounded. The general result would
appear to indicate that the French, in accordance with their usual
policy, had fired to cripple their enemy's spars and rigging, the
motive-power. This would be consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed
purpose of avoiding action except under favourable circumstances.
As the smoke thickened and confusion increased, the fleets had got
closer together, and, whatever the intention, many shot found their
way to the British hulls. Nevertheless, as the returns show, the
French hit were to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand,
it is certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the
action was greater than that of the British.
Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of
honour, or (if credit, for material advantage accrued to neither.
Keppel had succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his
will; d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superi-
ority of manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next
signal been promptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the
British fleet, in fairly good order, before it re-formed, and concen-
trated his fire on the more leewardly of its vessels. Even under the
delay, it was distinctly in his power to renew the fight ; and that
he did not do so forfeits all claim to victory. Not to speak of
the better condition of the French ships, Keppel, by running off
the wind, had given his opponent full opportunity to reach his fleet
and to attack. Instead of so doing, d'Orvilliers drew up under the
British lee, out of range, and offered battle ; a gallant defiance, but to a crippled foe.
Time was thus given to the British to refit their ships sufficiently
to bear down again. This the French admiral should not have per-
mitted. He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated ;
to windward, or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the
conditions, it was not good generalship to give the enemy time, and
to await his pleasure. Keppel, on the other hand, being granted
this chance, should have renewed the fight ; and here arose the con-
troversy which set all England by the ears, and may be said to have
immortalised this otherwise trivial incident. Palliser's division was
to windward from 4 to 7 P.M., while the signals were flying to form
line of battle, and to bear down in the Admiral's wake ; and Keppel
alleged that, had these been obeyed by 6 P.M., he would have re-
newed the battle, having still over two hours of daylight. It has
been stated already that, besides the signals, a frigate brought Palliser word that the Admiral was waiting only for him.
The immediate dispute is of slight present interest, except as an
historical link in the fighting development of the British Navy; and
only this historical significance justifies more than a passing mention.
In 1778 men's minds were still full of Byng's execution in 1757, and
of the Mathews and Lestock affair in 1744, which had materially in-
fluenced Byng's action off Minorca. Keppel repeatedly spoke of him-
self as on trial for his life ; and he had been a member of Byng's
court-martial. The gist of the charges against him, preferred by
Palliser, was that he attacked in the first instance without properly
forming his line, for which Mathews had been cashiered : and, sec-
ondly, that by not renewing the action after the first pass-by, and by
wearing away from the French fleet, lie had not done his utmost to
''take, sink, burn, and destroy" the latter, the charge on which
Byng was shot. Keppel, besides his justifying reasons for his course
in general, alleged and proved his full intention to attack again, had
not Palliser failed to come into line, a delinquency the same as that
of Lestock, which caused Mathews's ruin.
In other words, men's minds were breaking away from, but had
not thrown off completely, the tyranny of the Order of Battle, one
of the worst of tyrannies, because founded on truth. Absolute error,
like a whole lie, is open to speedy detection ; half-truths are troublesome. The Order of Battle was an admirable servant and a most
objectionable despot. Mathews, in despair over a recalcitrant second,
cast off the yoke, engaged with part of his force, was ill supported,
and cashiered ; Lestock escaping. Byng, considering this, and being
a pedant by nature, would not break his line ; the enemy slipped
away, Minorca surrendered, and he was shot. In Keppel's court-
martial, twenty-eight out of the thirty captains who had been in
the line were summoned as witnesses. Most 01 them swore that if
Keppel had chased in line of battle that day, there could have been
no action, and the majority of them cordially approved ; but there
was evidently an undercurrent still of dissent, and especially in the
rear ships, where there had been some of the straggling inevitable in
such movements, and whose commanders therefore had uncomfortable
experience of the lack of mutual support, which the line of battle was
meant to insure.
Another indication of still surviving pedantry was the obligation
felt in the rear ships to take post behind their own admiral, and to
remain there when the signals for the line of battle, and to bear down
in the admiral's wake, were flying. Thus Palliser's own inaction, to
whatever cause due, paralysed the six or eight sail with him ; but it
appears to the writer that Keppel was seriously remiss in not sum-
moning those ships by their own pennants, as soon as he began to
distrust the purposes of the Vice-Admiral, instead of delaying doing
so till 7 P. M., as lie did. It is a curious picture presented to us by the evidence. The Commander-in-Chief, with his staff and the cap-
tain of the ship, fretting and fuming on the Victory's quarter-deck ;
the signals flying which have been mentioned ; Harland's division
getting into line ahead ; and four points on the weather quarter, only
two miles distant, so that "every gun and port could be counted," a
group of seven or eight sail, among them the flag of the third in com-
mand, apparently indifferent spectators. The Formidable 1 & only sign
of disability was the foretopsail unbent for four hours, a delay which, being unexplained, rather increased than relieved suspicion, rife then throughout the Navy. Palliser was a Tory, and had left the Board of Admiralty to take his command. Keppel was so strong a Whig
that he would not serve against the Americans ; and he evidently
feared that he was to be betrayed to his ruin.
Palliser's defence rested upon three principal points : (1), that the
signal for the line of battle was not seen on board the formidable ;
(2), that the signal to get into the Admiral's wake was repeated by
himself ; (3), that his foremast was wounded, and. moreover, found to
be in such bad condition that he feared to carry sail on it. As re-
gards the first, the signal was seen on board the Ocean, next astern
of and "not far from" : the Formidable ; for the second, the Admiral
should have been informed of a disability by which a single ship was
neutralising a division. The frigate that brought Keppel's message
could have carried back this. Thirdly, the most damaging feature to
Palliser's case was that he asserted that, after coming out from under
fire, be wore at once towards the enemy ; afterwards he wore back
again. A ship that thus wore twice before three o'clock, might have
displayed zeal and efficiency enough to run two miles, off the wind, 1
at five, to support a fight. Deliberate treachery is impossible. To the writer the Vice-Admiral's behaviour seems that of a man in a sulk,
who will do only that which he can find no excuses for neglecting.
In such cases of sailing close, men generally slip over the line into
grievous wrong.
Keppel was cleared of all the charges preferred against him ; the
accuser had not thought best to embody among them the delay to
recall the ships which lie himself was detaining. Against Palliser
no specific charge was preferred, but the Admiralty directed a gen-
eral inquiry into his course on the 27th of July. The court found
his conduct " in many instances highly exemplary and meritorious,"
he had fought well, " but reprehensible in not having acquainted
the Commander-in-Chief of his distress, which he might have done
either by the Fox, or other means which he had in his power."
Public opinion running strongly for Keppel, his acquittal was cele-
brated with bonfires and illuminations in London; the mob got
drunk, smashed the windows of Palliser's friends, wrecked Palliser' s
own house, and came near to killing Palliser himself. The Admiralty,
in 1780, made him Governor of Greenwich Hospital.
On the 28th of July, the British and French being no longer in
sight of each other, Keppel, considering his fleet too injured aloft to cruise near the French coast, kept away for Plymouth, where ho
arrived on the 31st. Before putting to sea again, he provided against
a recurrence of the misdemeanour of the 27th by a general order, that
" in future the Line is always to be taken from the Centre." Had
this been in force before, Palliser's captains would have taken station by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Formidable would have been left to windward by herself. At the same time Howe was closing his
squadron upon the centre in America ; and Rodney, two years later,
experienced the ill-effects of distance taken from the next ahead, when the leading ship of a fleet disregarded an order.
Although privately censuring Palliser's conduct, the Commander-
in-Chief made no official complaint, and it was not until the matter got into the papers, through the talk of the fleet, that the difficulty began which resulted in the trial of both officers, early in the following year.
After this, Keppel, being dissatisfied with the Admiralty's treatment,
intimated his wish to give up the command. The order to strike his
flag was dated March 18th, 1779. He was not employed afloat again,
but upon the change of administration in 1782 he became First Lord
of the Admiralty, and so remained, with a brief intermission, until
December, 1783.
It is perhaps necessary, to mention that both British and French
asserted, and assert to this day, that the other party abandoned the
field. 1 The point is too trivial, in the author's opinion, to warrant
further discussion of an episode whose historical interest is very
slight, though its professional lessons are valuable. The British case
has the advantage through the courts-martial of the sworn testi-
mony of twenty to thirty captains, who agreed that the British kept
on the same tack under short sail throughout the night, and that
in the morning only three French ships were visible. As far as
known to the author, the French contention rests only on the usual
reports.
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