On-line: гостей 0. Всего: 0 [подробнее..]
АвторСообщение
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 257
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 05.06.08 22:09. Заголовок: Три судебных процесса в Англии в 18 веке


Англия уникальна в том отношении, что в этой стране судебный процесс по обвинению какого-либо адмирала в неисполнении долга и прочих упущениях широко обсуждался в Парламенте, прессе и обществе. Нигде более такого не было: во Франции, России, Испании, Швеции, Дании инициатива исходила всегда сверху, от монарха или морского министра, и дело рассматривалось келейно, в узком кругу. Мне известен всего один случай, когда де Грасс (в 1783-84 гг.) обвинил ряд своих капитанов и Бугенвилля в неоказании ему помощи и неисполнении его приказов, они отделались легким испугом, хотя в Англии в такой ситуации им могла грозить смертная казнь, для которой были бы (по английским законам) весьма веские основания. Но король и министр были против, и ничего страшного не случилось, законы трактовались совершенно произвольно.

В Англии, при наличии свободной прессы, в случае какой-либо кртики в адрес флагмана или капитана последние обычно требовали суда над собой, что в прочих странах представлялось (и представляется) дикостью.

Особый интерес представляют три процесса 18 века - над Мэтьюсом, Бингом и Кеппелом. При этом Бинг был членом суда над Мэтьюсом, а Кеппел - над Бингом. О процессе Бинга уже на форуме было обсуждение, я стремился привлечь внимание к тому, что все это дело было состряпано кликой Энсона и основывалось на лжесвидетельствах некоторых капитанов Бинга. Не менее интересны и два других процесса, при этом и там хватало самых грубых нарушений вплоть до преступлений (подлогов и т.п.).

Характерно то, что в ряде случаев подчиненные выдвигали обвинения против своих командиров - Лесток - против Мэтьюса, Пелисер - против Кеппела. Это едва ли может уложиться в голове в других странах. Скажем, можно ли себе представить, чтобы командующий армией мог бы потребовать суда над командующим фронтом (у нас во ВМВ) или младший флагман - суда над командующим флотом? Или - в более раннее время? суть не меняется.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
Ответов - 26 , стр: 1 2 All [только новые]


администратор


Сообщение: 259
Зарегистрирован: 09.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 06.06.08 15:32. Заголовок: У меня есть кое-како..


У меня есть кое-какой материал по всем трем, с выходных, если не возражаете, могу начать выкладывать.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 260
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 06.06.08 16:30. Заголовок: Benbow пишет: могу ..


Benbow пишет:

 цитата:
могу начать выкладывать



Начинайте, продолжим.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
администратор


Сообщение: 264
Зарегистрирован: 09.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 11.06.08 21:02. Заголовок: Как и обещал - начин..


Как и обещал - начинаю.

Первое - статья о процессе Бинга.

"A Man more Sinned against than Sinning:
The Trial and Execution of Admiral the Honourable John Byng
Part I

Article XII of the 1749 Articles of War read as follows:
Every Person in the Fleet, who through Cowardice, Negligence, or Disaffection, shall in Time of Action withdraw or keep, or not come into the Fight or Engagement, or shall not to do his utmost to take or destroy every Ship which it shall be his Duty to engage, and to assist and relieve all and every of his Majesty's Ships, or those of his Allies, which it shall be his Duty to assist and relieve, every such Person so offending, and being convicted thereof the Sentence of a Court-martial, shall suffer Death (Rodger, Articles 24).




Under this provision of the Articles, Admiral the Honourable John Byng, having been convicted of failing “to do his utmost to relieve St. Philip's Castle, in the Island of Minorca , then besieged by the Forces of the French King. . . [of failing] to do his utmost to take, seize, and destroy, the Ships of the French King. . . [of failing] and to assist such of His Majesty's Ships as were engaged in Fight with French Ships. . .” (“Defence” 39), met his death on board HMS Monarch at noon on 14 March 1757 . He was, in Jeremy Black's estimation, “the most prominent of a long series of 18 th century admirals disgraced and prosecuted for failures, real and apparent. . .” (137). Admiral Byng did not help himself by being cautiously experimental at the Battle of Minorca on 20 May 1757, but other factors played a role in his disastrous end before a firing squad. These factors included a politically unstable and inept ministry, a reforming Admiralty held hostage by threats of invasion, and outright bad luck in the Mediterranean. His trial, which took place six months after his arrest, and his execution, which took place six weeks after his conviction—an extraordinary length of time for the period—encompassed all of these factors, and at no time during the legal process did the British public ever cease to clamor for Byng's blood.

I—The Ministry

Political instability in British government was nothing new in the 18th century. There would be periods of intense competition for power among politicians followed by years of stability created by an outstanding prime minister—Sir Robert Walpole from 1721 to 1742, Henry Pelham from 1746 to 1754, William Pitt the Elder (with the Duke of Newcastle) from 1757 to 1761, Lord North from 1770 to 1782, and William Pitt the Younger from 1784 to 1801. The intervals between stability saw a general ministerial inability to accomplish governmental business and/or to promote British interests either in the colonies or in Europe . Henry Pelham's unexpected death in 1754 brought on a three-year period of competition among the Duke of Newcastle, whose jealousies had frequently driven secretaries of state to resign their posts; Henry Fox, the ambitious and opportunistic Secretary of State for War; and William Pitt the Elder, the ambitious and unstable Paymaster-General. In the period between 1754 and 1757, the unstable ministry could only respond to events; what passed for policy was, in fact, a series of half-measures taken for immediate reasons with little regard for long-term consequences.

Henry Pelham was the politically adroit half-brother of the Duke of Newcastle, and under his administration, secured by 1746, Britain sought peace in Europe and economy at home. To this end, the government signed the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), which closed the War of the Austrian Succession. Once the war was over—something that Britons desired after a decade of far-flung campaigning—Pelham embarked upon a reduction of forces; he cut the army from 50,000 to 19,000 and the navy from 50,000 to 10,000 men (O'Gorman 91). He lowered both taxes and spending and turned then to domestic legislation. His administration brought in acts dealing with interests and issues that concerned wide swaths of British society. His death ended this domestic political tranquility.

The duke of Newcastle took over leadership of the government on Pelham's death in March 1754. The jockeying for position began almost immediately. Fox and Pitt initially teamed up, but Newcastle was able to detach Fox, and Pitt gave the duke the opportunity to remove him from office in November 1755. Pitt attacked the ministry for excessive concern for the security of Hanover (of which King George II was Elector), for the practice of subsidizing allies, and for trying to contain the French solely in the colonies.

Pitt's criticisms of government focus had only limited legitimacy, for Newcastle had his hands tied by George II's position as Elector of Hanover. In 1755, France and Prussia were allied, and this arrangement seemed to make Hanover vulnerable to invasion. Furthermore, Britain's traditional allies, Austria and the United Provinces, were unwilling to underwrite the defense of the electorate. First, Newcastle tried to work alliances with Hesse-Cassel and Russia, but these arrangements required subsidies, and getting these payments through Parliament would have been difficult. Ultimately, Newcastle's administration signed an alliance with Frederick the Great's Prussia, and this, in turn, pushed Austria into the arms of France. Thus, the Diplomatic Revolution was born, thus, increasing the likelihood of war in Europe .

Pitt's attacks on Newcastle's policy concerning North America had greater validity. Conflict in North America had begun in 1754—the French and Indian War—and the beginning had not been auspicious. In 1754, when border disputes and tension between France and the British colonies, particularly Virginia, erupted into war, George Washington and his Virginians lost the battle and surrendered to the French. Newcastle 's ministry very much wanted to confine the war to North America because of peace negotiations it was pursuing with France throughout 1754 and 1755, but, simultaneously, the ministry decided to send reinforcements to North America and to intercept French attempts to do likewise. Admiral Edward Boscawen sailed in April 1755, and while he missed most of the French fleet off of Louisbourg in June 1755, his capture of two ships pushed toward war in Europe. The British also pursued the undeclared war with France that summer by capturing French vessels returning to French ports. On land, the French and their Indian allies continued to get the better of their British opponents: in July 1755, the French routed and killed General Edward Braddock, who tried to take Fort Duquesne (modern day Pittsburgh ) with poorly trained British soldiers unused to North American tactics and with inadequate intelligence. Defeat made the ministry try harder to win, and this approach, in turn, ratcheted up tension in Europe, but Newcastle 's ministry officially continued its policy of containment.

Even though the French had made clear preparations as early as October 1755 to take Minorca, an important and valued naval base acquired by Britain during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), the ministry clung to its unofficial war policy. In March 1756, Admiral Byng was given command of a small squadron of ships and ordered to the Mediterranean to defeat the French. However, his instructions on leaving for the Mediterranean, issued from the office of Secretary of State for War Henry Fox, through the Admiralty, reveal the importance the ministry placed on North America:
upon your arrival there [Gibraltar], you are to enquire whether and French squadron is come through the Staits; and, if there is, to inform yourself as will as possible, of their Number and Force, and if any Part of them were Transports: And as `tis probable they be designed for North America, and as his Majesty's Ships. . .are either at, or going to Halifax [Nova Scotia], and are to cruise off Louisbourg and the Mouth of the River St. Laurance [sic], you are immediately to take the Soldiers out of so many Ships of your Squadron, as, together with the Ships at and going to Halifax, will make a force superior to the said French squadron. . . and then detach them under the Command of Rear Admiral West, directing him to make the best of his Way off Louisbourg, and taking the aforementioned Ships, which he may expect to find there, under his Command, to cruise off the said Place, and the Entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and use his utmost Endeavors to intercept and seize the aforesaid French Ships, or any other Ships belonging to the French, that may be bound to, or returning from that Part of North-America (“Trial” A2-3)


This was first among his orders. Next, he was instructed to find whether or not the French had Minorca. If they had, Byng was ordered to relieve Minorca. If the French had not attacked Minorca, he and his fleet were to head for Toulon, the base of the French Mediterranean fleet, and blockade. Byng's fleet was also supposed to attack and seize French and privateer shipping. The last part of Byng's instructions again reflect the far greater concern the ministry had for keeping the French fleet out of the North Atlantic, away from Great Britain and then Canada:
If any French Ships of war should sail from Toulon, and escape your Squadron, and proceed out of the Mediterranean, you are forthwith to send, or repair yourself to England, with a proportionable Part of the Ships under your Command; observing that [emphasis mine] you are never to keep more ships in the Mediterranean, than shall be necessary for executing the Services recommended to you (Trial A2-3)


Although Byng sailed on 26 April 1756 with his squadron for Minorca, Newcastle 's ministry only declared war on France in May.

The inconclusive Battle of Minorca, fought on 20 May 1756, prevented the relief of St. Philip's Castle on Minorca, and the whole island fell to the French on 29 June 1756. The loss of this important naval base was another among the failures of British arms since 1754, but when the dispatch of French Admiral Galissoniere arrived on 2 June, the ministry received a gift. Galissoniere reported that on 19 May the English “seemed unwilling to engage” and that on 20 May, “the English had the advantage of the wind, but still seemed unwilling to fight”; he expected to be attacked on 21 May, but “the English had disappeared” (Walpole 215). The French dispatch appeared in British newspapers, inciting the British populace, and when Byng's own dispatch appeared on 23 June, the ministry made the most of the three weeks' hiatus to duck any responsibility for failure. Byng's dispatch was edited—by whom remains unclear—and a newspaper, London Gazette, published this cut-down document. It made Byng appear as cowardly and indecisive as the French had suggested he was. Furthermore, the ministry had its order to arrest Byng published, thus making Byng the focus of British public hostility (Lincoln 47). The ministry transferred blame and responsibility for its failures to Byng, convicting the admiral in the court of popular opinion before having him convicted before a court martial.

This transfer was not entirely successful, for Britain had slid into global war—in India , the Nawab of Bengal had seized the East India Company's seat of Calcutta in June 1756. Newcastle 's ministry was unable to stand the pressure, particularly after the fall of Minorca and all the clamor associated with Byng's trial. Pitt, who had continued to attack the ministry since his dismissal from office, demanded an inquiry into the fiasco of Minorca. While the inquiry came to the conclusion that no greater force could have been spared at the time (Middleton, Bells 16), Byng's case turned into general attack on the ineptitude of the ministry since 1754. Henry Fox resigned first in October, and Newcastle himself resigned in November 1756. William Pitt came in with the duke of Devonshire, and they remained in office until early 1757 when the ministry reshuffled yet again. In its new incarnation, Pitt was teamed with Newcastle, and this ministry directed the war through 1761 when Pitt was sacked by the new king, George III. The global war did turn around for the British by 1758, and North America was, for all intents and purposes, British by 1760. In Europe, the war was more dependent upon the actions of others, namely Frederick the Great of Prussia and Peter III of Russia , and thus peace took longer to achieve, but the Peace of Paris of 1763 brought the Seven Years' War to a conclusion.

II—The Admiralty

Below the great offices of the ministry came the Board of Admiralty, and like the government in general, it suffered the vicissitudes of politics and patronage. The Admiralty controlled naval patronage—who got what ship, what promotion, what assignment—and advised the government on naval policy, but it was subordinate to the ministry. Everybody agreed that the navy was important, particularly to British trade and to British foreign policy, but different ministries had different emphases. Faction and distrust between Admiralty and ministry existed, particularly during periods of political instability, and reduction in funding, like that requested and required by Henry Pelham, simply exacerbated relations between ministers and the Board of Admiralty.

During the Pelham-Newcastle period, there were three important men at the Admiralty, all of whom pushed a reform agenda of stronger discipline, particularly among the officers, better manning of the navy, and better management of the dockyards. These three men were the duke of Bedford, his protégé the earl of Sandwich, and Admiral Lord Anson, all of whom were, in turn, First Lords of the Admiralty. Bedford moved up to a secretary of state in 1748 despite his clashes with the duke of Newcastle. Sandwich took over as First Lord, and Anson came to sit on the Board of Admiralty in 1749, becoming First Lord in 1751.

On Sandwich's watch, the Admiralty pushed through a thorough revision of the Articles of War, the basis of naval discipline. The charges listed therein provided the only grounds for a court martial. The previous Articles of War had been promulgated upon the restoration of Charles II, and this first set of Articles did little or nothing to curb indiscipline and insubordination among the navy's officers. Officers frequently showed a tendency to refuse to engage the enemy despite direct orders from superiors to do so, and under the Articles of 1661, courts martial frequently refused to inflict severe punishment on such officers. The clause “or such other punishment as the Court Martial shall see fit” allowed the boards of the courts martial to hand out minimal or no punishment (Rodger, Articles 9). Furthermore, officers could resign their active commissions and go on half-pay; they would not, then, be subject to the discipline of the service. The new Articles of War, pushed through Parliament in 1749, sought to close these loopholes. In general, the new Articles tightened up discipline, but Admiral Byng ran afoul of Article XII, for which, the only penalty the court martial board could assign was death. This lack of maneuvering room was not amended until 1778.

The Fighting Instructions ran alongside the Articles of War in guiding the behavior of officers at sea. These instructions had been issued in 1691, in 1703, and again in 1744 when they became permanent. They dealt in increasing detail with the manner in which captains were to engage the enemy. The permanent Fighting Instructions dictated line to line engagement—the passage of two lines of ships firing at each other—as the preferred method of combat. Developed because of the difficulty of seeing signals during battle, the Instructions' virtue lay in the fact they could be prearranged and enforced by naval disciplines, namely the Articles of War (Keegan 48). They also developed in recognition of the unwieldy nature of square-rigged ships, which contributed to inconclusive engagements. To gain clear-cut victories, according to John Keegan, “several British admirals of the 18 th century, of whom Byng was one, experimented at the risk of professional—even personal—extinction with tactics more likely to yield a decisive outcome” (48). Breaking, or the crossing a line of battle with a ship or group of ships, was not discovered until Admiral Rodney, by serendipity, crossed the French line of battle in the Caribbean in 1782 at the Battle of the Saints. It gave the decisive victory, but breaking did not alter the permanent Fighting Instructions until after Horatio Nelson used it to such great effect at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent in 1797 and again at Trafalgar in 1805.

Also while First Lord of the Admiralty, Sandwich attempted to take on the related issues of manning the navy and producing greater efficiency at the Navy Board, which supplied the navy and which was only nominally under Admiralty supervision. Sandwich actually investigated the royal dockyards for the purpose of reducing corruption and inefficiency. Given the drastic reduction in funding for all the armed services under Henry Pelham, this drive for efficiency was well placed, but entrenched interests at the Navy Board meant it went nowhere. Furthermore, Sandwich crossed swords with Pelham over retaining skilled seamen in the navy and maintaining the strength of the navy. He failed; moreover, he was removed from office in 1751. Pelham and his brother Newcastle, who had had falling out, reconciled that year, and the renewed fraternal alliance allowed for the dismissal of Sandwich, who had not helped matters by earning George II's enmity. The sacking of Sandwich, in turn, provoked the resignation of the duke of Bedford, who was no longer necessary to Newcastle.

Sandwich's removal was not a disaster for the Admiralty. The new First Lord, Admiral Lord Anson, agreed with and fought for Sandwich's objectives, but he had better political connections. His father-in-law, Lord Hardwick, the Lord Chancellor, was tightly connected to the duke of Newcastle. These connections allowed Anson to promote sound discipline in the navy through the promotion of best officers without regard to their political connections and to continue to pursue the Navy Board—the latter with minimal success. Anson did press home standardization of equipment on board ship, but he could not make the Navy Board produce more sound ships. By 1753, there were 97 ships of the line in service, but there were complaints about many of the ships being unfit for sea. Many had not seen maintenance since 1748, and the Navy Board was noncompliant with demands to redress these issues. In 1756, the Navy Board could only produce two new ships of ninety guns, and this inability forced contract building on the Admiralty. While Anson still had to fight for manpower, he did succeed in getting the numbers of seamen raised over the threshold set by Pelham—13,000 sailors and 5,000 marines (Middleton “Administration”; Pack 189). That said, manpower problems still existed in 1756: due to the need for men for the undeclared war in North America; due to the perceived threat of a French invasion of Britain itself; and due to the means of procuring these seamen—impressment. These problems contributed to Anson's inability to scrape together a fleet to send to the Mediterranean until April 1756.

The most immediate issue in Lord Anson's mind, and therefore affecting any Mediterranean fleet, was the invasion scare. Over the course of the fall and winter of 1755-56, Britain wondered if the French would invade Great Britain. The Diplomatic Revolution pushed the French toward that move, but they also made moves toward Minorca and Gibraltar , with the idea of turning them back to Spain, a French ally, and from whom the British had taken the islands during the War of the Spanish Succession. It seemed as if the French intended to force Britain to try and cover two theaters of war or to weaken one in favor of the other (Pack 192-3).

Lord Anson's own assessment of the situation stressed the Channel Fleet, the one that would repel the French invasion—if it came. Anson believed an invasion of Britain far more likely than one of Minorca, and he would not move to strengthen the Mediterranean fleet until French intentions were clear. (Middleton, Bells 5). Furthermore, he focused his attentions on blockading French ports, and to this end, in the autumn of 1755, he sent eighteen ships of the line under his protégé Sir Edward Hawke to form a powerful squadron. Hawke was under orders to take French war and merchant ships and bring them to Britain —without an actual declaration of war. In January 1756, Admiral Osborn went to sea with a large squadron to convoy outward-bound merchantmen and then to reconnoiter the Channel; upon Osborn's return, Hawke went to sea to cruise the Channel, and he received reinforcements in April 1756.

Lord Anson considered the Channel of far greater import, and regarded the threat to Minorca as an attempt to divide British defenses or merely as a feint. In light of this belief, why send any fleet to the Mediterranean, particularly with less than seaworthy ships? Neither the ministry nor the Admiralty could willingly let so valuable possession simply be taken without a shot fired in anger. To do so would have been political suicide, especially in light of the near misses and outright defeats since 1754.

Minorca, however, remained a secondary theater, something to be seen in both the smallness of the squadron assigned—ten ships of the line, equipped and manned with difficulty—and the commander appointed to overall command by the Admiralty—Vice-Admiral the Honourable John Byng. Several factors went into his appointment. He had held senior command in there during the War of the Austrian Succession, so he had extensive knowledge of waters and conditions. Furthermore, he had family connection to the Mediterranean: his father, George Byng, viscount Torrington, had fought and won a notable engagement against the Spaniards in the Mediterranean in 1718. The younger Byng requested the command and apparently used both his prior service in the Mediterranean and his family connections to secure the command, to which he was formally appointed on March 11, 1756.

Did Byng have Anson's full support? This appointment occurred in apparent defiance of the First Lord's usual practice of appointing only the best officers. Apparently Anson regarded Byng as lacking leadership, initiative, and popularity (Pack 193). Thinking Byng (among other senior officers) overcautious, he complained, “I don't know how it comes to pass that unless our commanders-in-chief have a very great superiority of the enemy, they never think themselves safe” (qtd. in Gardiner 159). Byng did protest, before he sailed in April 1756, the inadequacy of his squadron before the enemy. But at the same time, Anson proclaimed “that Byng's squadron could beat anything the French had” (qtd in Gardiner 159). Either way, Byng sailed from St. Helen's on 6 April 1756 and reached Gibraltar on 2 May 1756 , and while he was in the Mediterranean, he was promoted from Vice-Admiral to Admiral of the Blue.

Part II

III—The Mediterranean

In its undeclared war against France, the Newcastle ministry knew the French planned to invade Minorca as early as October 1755. But, preoccupied by fears of invasion of Great Britain, both ministry and Admiralty concentrated naval power in the Channel. The Mediterranean squadron, already on station and under the command of Captain Edgecumbe, consisted of three ships of the line and some small craft (Clowes 146). It received no reinforcement until Admiral Byng sailed with a squadron of ten ships of the line on 6 April 1756. On one hand, the government had ignored the situation in the Mediterranean until the last moment, and on the other hand, it exerted pressure on Byng to move with all speed.

Completing crews was complicated by the Admiralty which forbade pulling men from ships in harbor in Portsmouth. After strenuous complaints from Byng, the Admiralty relented to some degree and allowed Byng to complete his crews by raiding the men of those ships in harbor. One battle the admiral did not win: he had to leave his marines with other ships in Portsmouth and take on Colonel Lord Robert Bertie’s fusiliers. The point of the fusiliers lay in land operations against the French in Minorca—if Byng could actually land them as reinforcements. They were not trained for sea combat as marines were, thus reducing their effectiveness at sea, and if they were offloaded before a sea battle, then Byng’s naval forces would be substrength and therefore severely compromised for sea action (Clowes 147).

Despite these problems, Byng sailed on 6 April 1756 and arrived in Gibraltar on 2 May where he joined Captain Edgecumbe and his small Mediterranean squadron. Here, he learnt that the French had, indeed, left Toulon with an army of between 13,000 and 16,000 men and a squadron of 13 ships of the line. The French had left on 10 April and had arrived by 18 April, taking everything save St. Philip’s Castle, the most heavily fortified position on the island and commanded by General Sir William Blakeney, aged 82 and bedridden by gout. Now at Gibraltar, Byng discovered he had to relieve a siege.

Byng received no support from Lt. General Folke, the governor of Gibraltar. Folke had orders from the ministry to provide troops, a battalion, to Byng, and to expedite Byng’s necessary refit to attempt the relief of Minorca. Folke put Gibraltar ahead of Minorca: he desired to keep as many, if not all, of his troops at Gibraltar in the mistaken belief that Gilbraltar was now under immediate threat of attack (Tunstall 69). In a Council of War, Folke and his staff came to two conclusions: one, since such sizeable French forces had attacked and besieged Minorca, British forces could not hope to lift the siege, so it would be folly to send men from Gilbraltar and weaken it unnecessarily; two, should Byng engage the larger French fleet and sustain combat damage, Gibraltar, again, would be under threat (Tunstall 72-3; Clowes 147). This justification allowed Folke to refuse to supply Byng with the needed troops. It also, as Brian Tunstall put it, gave “a curt hint to Byng to refuse engagement at sea” (75).

At this point, Byng, who had to have been demoralized, contributed to his own problems by not forcing Folke to obey the government orders. His second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Temple West, said and did nothing to back up his commanding officer. Additionally, Byng wrote the Admiralty to detail the disastrous state of repair of Edgecumbe’s squadron. Folke wrote a similar letter to the Admiralty, and together, the two letters gave an air of collusion between Byng and Folke. More importantly, Folke’s letter made clear the general’s desire to cover his posterior: "[t]he enclosed copy of the proceedings of the Council will more fully explain the motive for our opinion, and will, I hope, fully acquit me from any imputation of disobedience to His Majesty’s commands" (qtd. in Tunstall 87). By extension, all blame belonged to Byng.

Folke himself was court-martialed for his refusal to obey Byng’s orders and render the battalion, but he pled discretion allowed by his own orders and the imminent danger of Gibraltar. In the end, Folke received a suspension from duty for a year — "for having mistaken his orders" — and was busted from his regiment by the king (Walpole 229-30).

Despite the cowardice and deceit at Gibraltar, Byng left on 8 May 1756 for Minorca with his and Edgecumbe’s ships. Sailing east into headwinds made for slow passage, particularly with ships not in the best physical repair, and the squadron did not reach Minorca until 19 May. St. Philip’s Castle and the British squadron attempted to make contact with each other, but before communication could be achieved, the French squadron under Admiral Galissonière appeared. Admiral Byng gave the order to chase at 2pm and made ready to engage the enemy. By 7pm, on the evening of 19 May, the British and French squadrons were two leagues (three miles) apart. Neither sought or wanted a risky night engagement.

In his tactics, Byng sought the decisive encounter, but in the end, the decision to lask condemned him. In lasking, Byng approached the French line of battle at an angle—somewhere between 30 and 45 degrees—instead of in parallel as required by the permanent Fighting Instructions. The goal here was for each ship in Byng’s line of battle to take its opposite number, cross in front of the enemy’s bow, and rake the enemy ship with a broadside. The enemy ship would not be able to return fire without coming about. This procedure constituted a crossing of the enemy ship’s T (Tunstall 119). A style of engagement known since the end of the 17th century, it could provide a decisive victory with reduced loss of life — a necessity when getting crews was hard at best — but lasking required discipline seamanship, pristine ships, precision sailing, and good luck to succeed.

Compounding the risky decision to lask, Byng should have divided his squadron into three divisions: the van(guard), the center, and the rear. Effectively, however, Byng divided his squadron into two divisions. It remains unclear whether he did not trust some of his senior captains or he was simply incapable of delegating. West, his second-in-command, commanded the van while Byng held command over the center-rear. Galissoniere did have the tripartite division of his squadron, and this made it easier for the French, who were known for their long-range cannon fire, to come into position and bear down on the British. West’s division, the van, attacked the rear of the French van and came under heavy fire.

The British took heavy damage aloft, making several ships unmaneuverable. One ship, Intrepid, lost her foretopmast and lay vulnerable to two French ships. Revenge pulled between Intrepid and the two French ships, thus saving Intrepid, but contributing to a traffic jam in the middle of the line of battle. The French exploited this by pummeling Princess Louisa, next in line after Revenge, and forcing the ship behind her to fetch up behind Revenge, well out of position. The ships behind these had to take in sail to avoid colliding with the clustered ships. This muddle created a gap between Byng’s and West’s divisions, and it prevented the rest of line, including Byng’s ship Ramilles, from getting close enough to the enemy to engage fully, if at all.

The French attempted to capitalize on their advantage, but by the time they sailed into position, the rest of the British line appeared, forcing the French to fire on them instead. Byng had managed to close the gap, but he had lost any advantage, and the French slipped away.

Byng was fortunate in that this was technically a draw. He lost no ships, but there was loss of life with the French suffering in equal number, if not equal status. Captain Andrews of Defiance was killed outright, and Captain Noel of Princess Louisa had his leg shot off and died several days after the action. Byng’s squadron had suffered severely in terms of its upper masts, yards, and rigging, and Byng used this damage to call a Council of War aboard Ramilles where he presented his captains with five propositions:

• 1. Whether an attack on the French fleet gave an prospect of relieving Mahon [St. Philip’s Castle]? Resolved: It did not.

• 2. Whether, if there were no French fleet cruising at Minorca, the British fleet could raise the siege? Resolved: It did not.

• 3. Whether Gilbraltar would not be in danger, should any accident befall Byng’s fleet? Resolved: It would be in danger.

• 4. Whether an attack by the British fleet in its present state upon that of the French would not endanger Gibraltar, and expose the trade in the Mediterranean to great hazards? Resolved: It would.

• 5. Whether it is not rather for His Majesty’s service that the fleet should proceed immediately to Gibraltar? Resolved: It should proceed to immediately to Gibraltar (qtd. Clowes 151).


With the notion that they could do nothing to save Minorca, Byng sailed back to Gibraltar where, on 19 June, he found the reinforcements that had been sent out under Commodore Thomas Broderick, who had arrived 15 June 1756.

Galissonière’s dispatch reached Britain on 2 June, courtesy of French and Spanish diplomatic pouches, and made Byng and the British fleet out to be disinclined to fight and even cowardly. "After having made their greatest efforts against our rear division, which they found so close and from which they received so hot a fire that they could not break in upon it, they made up their minds to sheer off, and did not appear again during the whole of the next day. Speaking generally, none of their ships long withstood the fire of ours" (qtd. in Clowes 152). Dated 25 May and arrived in Britain on 23 June, Byng’s own dispatch, much lengthier, concluded the engagement was a qualified victory for the British—despite all the difficulties imposed upon his forces—because the French disappeared. Byng made clear in this dispatch that he would refit in Gibraltar, find what reinforcements he could, and re-engage the French as soon as possible:

I sent their Lordships [the Admiralty] the resolutions of the council of war, in which there was not the least contention or doubt arose. I hope, indeed, we shall find stores to right us at Gibraltar: and, if I have any reinforcement, will not lose a moment of time to seek the enemy again, and once more give them battle, though they have a great advantage in being clean ships that go three feet to our one, and therefore have their choice how they will engage us, or if they will at all; and will never let us close them, as their sole view is the disabling our ships, in which they have but too well succeeded, though we obliged them to bear up (qtd in Clowes 155).


This paragraph, which both criticizes the state of naval preparedness and shows Byng in a favorable light, was excised, along with several other paragraphs in the same vein, by Newcastle’s ministry. The cut-down document appeared in London Gazette on 26 June.

In response to the French view of engagement, the Admiralty sent out Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hawke and Rear-Admiral Charles Saunders, promoted specifically for the purpose, to supercede Byng and West. The Admiralty cut their orders on 8 June, and when Hawke and Saunders arrived at Gibraltar on 3 July, they, per those orders, placed Byng, West, and many others, either required as witnesses or superceded themselves, on board Antelope (Richmond 213-7). That ship sailed for England on 9 July. In the intervening time, the Admiralty had decided to arrest and court-martial Byng. When he arrived at Spithead on 26 July, the Admiralty had him taken into custody and transferred, on 9 August, to Greenwich, where he was clapped into prison. There Admiral Byng remained until transferred to Portsmouth for trial.

IV—The Trial and Execution

The Newcastle ministry was unstable and had been following a contradictory policy regarding war with France since 1754 — wanting to confine conflict to North America while preserving peace in Europe. This policy had singularly failed, and Minorca was prime evidence of it. Now, the Newcastle ministry had yet another failure of British arms on its hands, and the Minorca crisis, meaning the status of Admiral Byng, became the primary domestic political issue of the summer through winter of 1756. The weak Newcastle ministry tried to foist all blame on Byng in an attempt to save itself from collapse, and to this end, the admiral suffered trial in and figurative execution at the hands of the court of public opinion.

On one hand, the ministry had sent too little to Minorca too late and yet had fully expected Byng to win a resounding victory, thus raising public expectations. Furthermore, Lord Anson at the Admiralty, despite his private misgivings about Byng’s lack of initiative, had publicly expressed fullest confidence in Byng’s ability to defeat any French threat in the Mediterranean. This attitude matched and even helped bolster public sentiment. Living in Florence, Italy, Horace Mann, an intimate correspondent with Horace Walpole, exemplified British attitudes: “we were expecting every instant that Byng would send home Marshal Richelieu’s [French army commander] head to be placed upon Temple Bar. . .” (Lewis, 20, 560). When these expectations were not realized, the political hue and outcry broke upon the Newcastle ministry, and it used every means in its disposal, including the editing and publication of Byng’s dispatch and the publication of their warrant for Byng’s arrest, to push all rage onto Admiral Byng, who discovered upon his return to Britain a vociferously hostile public crowd.

Before he had even set foot in England, Byng had been burned in effigy in major towns in Britain, and an enraged mob had attacked his country house in Hertfordshire (Walpole 217). Before and after disembarkation, Byng found himself at the mercy of pamphlet and ballads like “Sing Tantarara Hang Byng” (Walpole 217-8; Lincoln 46). Political theater was nothing new in the 18th century, and The Sham Fight: Or Political Humbug heaped criticism upon Byng, and by extension, the ministry, for corruption, patronage, family influence, and aristocratic degeneracy. (Byng collected fine porecelain.) Altogether, according to the play, these things caused the admiral to fail in doing his duty (Lincoln 47).

In the face of this kind of public hostility, most of which was quite low-brow, Byng fought back, complaining he was censured by “armchair admirals who required ‘no other Abilities, than a great deal of Ill-nature, and a little Wit’” (qtd in Lincoln 48). He had his full, unedited dispatch published. He also had his committed partisans who attacked the ministry full force. They, or their hired writers, of whom one was Samuel Johnson, wrote pamphlets promoting Byng’s cause. (Johnson wrote two.) Pro-Byng ballads—one of which was composed to "God Save the King" (Lincoln 48) — and anti-ministry caricatures pilloried the ministry for yet more incompetence and corruption. Ultimately the idea came forward that the ministry sought to hang Byng for all its folly, incompetence, and inability to conduct a war, for which there was plenty of evidence built up since 1754; by August 1756, the tide of public opinion began to turn against the ministry (Lincoln 47). Henry Fox, Secretary of State for the South (which in 1782, became the Home Office), wrote to the Duke of Devonshire on 12 August: "I do not think my offer with regard to Pit in the least generous. — For this administration has, I think, lost the good will and good opinion of their country, (which they six months ago enjoyed to a great degree) and without them who can wish to be in administration" (qtd in Black 122).

Before Byng could even be brought to trial, Newcastle’s ministry collapsed. Part of the ministry’s demise had to do with internal bickering and mistrust. Newcastle put out feelers to William Pitt the Elder, the most eloquent opposition politicians. This move, in turn made Fox distrust Newcastle, who himself felt unable to rely on Fox. The political storm surrounding the Minorca loss nourished the feeding frenzy within the ministry, particularly as it had to face explicit questions on how it handled Byng’s mission. In his reply to Mann on 24 July 1756, Walpole bluntly laid out the line of interrogation: "In short, all your questions of why was not Byng sent sooner? why not with more ships? why was not Minorca supported sooner? all these are questions which all the world is asking as well as you…" (Lewis, 20, 577-8). Pitt pushed this line, demanding a parliamentary inquiry into the loss of Minorca. Amidst the storm, Fox resigned in October 1756. Newcastle attempted to bring in Pitt to stabilize the ministry and lead the House of Commons, but Pitt categorically refused. Unable to find a leader for Commons, Newcastle himself resigned in November, and he was replaced by the Duke of Devonshire as First Lord of the Treasury (prime minister) and Pitt as Secretary of State for the South.

The change in ministry did not help Admiral Byng. Something of a caretaker and disliked by King George II, this ministry was weak and would prove to be short-lived: in early 1757, Newcastle replaced Devonshire as First Lord, and he and Pitt would work in stable tandem. King George II remained hostile to Byng and unhappy with Pitt, and this, in combination with political paralysis, allowed the prosecution of Byng to go forward.

Byng had no defense attorney for this proceeding, for it was not the practice of courts martial to provide counsel ("Defence" 3). He also had been denied an extra list of witnesses by the Admiralty, which had accommodated his first request for witnesses. Byng had asked for his first set of witness in a letter dated 4 August, and he requested another set in a letter dated 6 September. The Admiralty’s response, as composed by John Cleveland, the clerk of the Admiralty, on 9 September, made clear the Admiralty wanted the trial over as quickly as possible and found Byng obstructionist:

Under these Circumstances they [the Admiralty] cannot help expressing their Astonishment at your Application for the 6th Instant, with a new list of no fewer than 31 Officers to be sent for, without the least Fact, Proof, or even Allegation to support this Request, or to excuse [its] not being made before; their Lordships look upon it merely as a Scheme suggested to you to delay your being brought to a Trial, which must be the necessary Consequence, if your Application should be complied with; by the same Means you may put off your Trial for ever; it is but applying for a new List every Month or fix Weeks, and at last concluding with a Desire that the whole Fleet may be brought home ("Defence" 30).


Cleveland’s tone and word choice suggested Byng was a coward, and the Admiralty clerk further added a presupposition of guilt, saying that Byng had been "indulged to so great an Extent as may make an Example very dangerous to the Service and Discipline of the Navy; but Justice to the Public requires that Person accused, who certainly may be guilty, should not under the bare Pretence of desiring Means of Defence make Trial absolutely Impracticable" (Byng 30). Byng rather forcefully repudiated charges of obstreperousness in a letter dated 14 September, but it had no effect upon the Admiralty, which dismissed his request for further witnesses and ignored him thereafter.

The court martial convened on 27 December 1757 under the presidency of Vice-Admiral Thomas Smith. All members of this court martial board were junior in rank to Admiral Byng. On 28 December, Byng was brought before the bar and acquainted with all charges against him. The real business of the court martial began on 29 December and ran through the admiral’s sentencing on 27 January 1757. The court fixated on three naval issues: sufficiency of sail to bear down upon the enemy; failure to close the distance between the two lines of battle; and the failure to fire at the proper distance. Although disputed in the reasoning, the failure to relieve Minorca was established early in the proceedings.

The two most devastating witnesses for the Admiralty were General Blakeney, the besieged commander at St. Philip’s Castle, and Captain Everritt of Buckingham, Rear-Admiral West’s ship. Blakeney energetically asserted that Colonel Lord Robert Bertie’s fusiliers could have been landed before the battle, particularly as the French were desperate for ammunition, and that with those troops he could have held out until Sir Edward Hawke arrived with relief ("Trial" 6, 8-9; "Proceedings" 11). Captain Everritt brought Buckingsham’s ship’s log with him—to which Byng, conducting his own defense, objected: "[t]he log-book is not a proper Testimony, and therefore ought not to be used" ("Trial" 7). The court allowed Everritt to refresh his memory about things he had actually observed. Everritt’s testimony emphasized that Byng’s division did not carry sufficient sail to bear down upon the enemy and that Byng failed to close the distance between his ships and the French, thus costing the British the victory. Byng’s own flag captain, Captain Gardiner, testified that he advised the admiral to bear upon the enemy, but Byng had objected because of what had happened to Admiral Matthews in a similar in situation in the Mediterranean during the last war ("Trial" 18). (Matthews had himself been court-martialled, and Byng had sat on that court martial board.) Captain Gardiner, followed by Bertie, did establish Byng’s personal courage.

Byng defended himself in court in a long, prepared statement that was subsequently published. He maintained that he did his best to relieve Minorca, that he had had an inferior force compared to the French in terms of size of ships, weight of metal (the guns), number of men, and even condition of the ships. But most of all, the French held the point of sail and could sail as they pleased. What pleased them was to retreat from the scene of battle, as Byng pointed out:

Now instead of my retreating from an inferior Force, that a superior Force retreated from me, when the Fleet was unable to pursue, I shall manifest beyond all contradiction, and cannot help observing, that perhaps I am the first Instance of a Commander in Chief, whose Disgrace proceeded from so unfortunate a Mistake (“Defence” 5).


From there, he placed the blame for the failure squarely upon the ministry and the Admiralty, which had sent him and his squadron out in such poor condition.

In spite of a spirited defense, the court martial found that Byng should have landed the troops at Minorca. The board suggested, in hindsight, that he should have used one of his frigates for this purpose before, and even with, the appearance of the French squadron. There was too much separation between West and Byng’s divisions, and this was due to the insufficiency of sail carried by Byng’s division. More sail spread would have allowed all ships to maintain their proper stations, to engage fully the enemy, and to West’s vanguard appropriately. Most importantly, the court found that Byng had failed to do his utmost to relieve Minorca, specifically St. Philip’s Castle, and that he had failed to destroy the French squadron. As a result, they had no choice but to convict him for failing to abide by the Articles of War—Article 12 in specific—and condemn him to death.

He was sentenced to death on 27 January 1757, but the execution did not take place until 14 March 1757 because several members of the court martial sought to have the conviction overturned in the House of Lords. Captain the Honorable Augustus Keppel, himself to be court-martialed but acquitted in 1778 over an inconclusive battle in the English Channel, sat in the House of Commons and helped push the issue before the Law Lords who demolished the attempt to save Byng. The king refused to exercise his prerogative of pardon, and Admiral the Honorable John Byng died by firing squad at noon on the quarterdeck of Monarch on 14 March 1757, a victim both of political animosity and his own errors of cautious judgment. "

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
администратор


Сообщение: 265
Зарегистрирован: 09.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 11.06.08 21:48. Заголовок: По Мэтьюзу. Рискну н..


По Мэтьюзу. Рискну немного отойти от темы процессов и прежде всего рекомендую сайт, который мне очень понравился
http://www.todoababor.es/articulos/sicie.htm
А так же ссылочку про войну за ухо Дженкинса (в составе экспедиции Вернона участвовал комодор Лесток)
http://warandgame.wordpress.com/2008/02/17/war-of-jenkins’-ear-1739–1742/

Теперь по теме:
Насколько я понимаю, этот процесс был закрытым, поэтому мне самому было бы интересно почитатоь бумаги по этому делу.


Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 269
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 12.06.08 22:10. Заголовок: Benbow пишет: бумаг..


Benbow пишет:

 цитата:
бумаги по этому делу.



Я довольно долго искал материалы по тулонскому делу, имеется обмен письмами между Мэтьюсом и Лестоком сразу после сражения, в прессе того времени есть заключение суда (полное) по процесу Лестока (он был оправдан по всем пунктам), список обвинений Лестока (очень длинный) и ответы на него Мэтьюса. Решение суда Мэтьюс не получил (хоть и просил об этом), все материалы по этому сражению и суду приведены у Ричмонда (Navy in the War of 1739-1748), есть и некоторые памфлеты того времени и описания участников сражения.

Обвинения Мэтьюсу коротко:
1. Виновен в том, что пошел в атаку, не дожидаясь построения линии баталии (17 голосов судей против 2).
2. Не провел атаку авангарда против авангарда (14 - 5)
3. Создал ненужную опасность для флота тем, что слишком близко подошел к Real'у (но здессь - только 11 против 8)
4. Оправдан (14 - 5) по обвинению в "нарушении долга и создания огромной опасности для флота Е.В.".

Ряд капитанов, не поддержавших Мэтьюса, также были преданы суду, но наказания им были символические, только Бэрриша выгнали (как и Мэтьюса) из службы (он безучастно наблюдал за Marlborough в тяжелом положении и пошел на помощь ему только по приказу Мэтьюса).

Если бы Мэтьюс строил линию баталии, сражения вообще бы не было, как и в 1778 при Уэссане (но в этом случае-в 1778 - судьи были умнее).

В приведенном тексте по Менорке 1756 есть неточности: Revenge не закрывал дорогу последующим кораблям, спасая Intrepide, наоборот, он пытался обойти его с наветра и застрял там, а Гардинер не предлагал Бингу идти в атаку (это - подняя выдумка), Бинг был в коробочке" и не смог бы идти на пр-ка при всем желании, дорогу закрывали Princess Louisa и Trident. Бинг не убавлял пруса (тоже выдумка), оказавшись в "коробочке", в дыму, он приказал брасопить реи, задержка составила всего 5-6 минут, решение суда, что надо было приказать передним ЛК прибавить паруса - абсурд: на мачте Ramillies развевались 2 сигнала: "в линию баталии" и "атаковать пр-ка", но капитаны не исполняли его приказы. Впрочем, все это я уже прежде излагал. Англ. историки, из любви к Энсону, врут до сих пор. При чем тут премьер и министры? Во всем виноват только Энсон, он и назначил Бинга, и распределял корабли. Но главное - без армии Бинг никак не мог спасти Менорку (как и Хок).

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 270
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 14.06.08 11:18. Заголовок: Benbow пишет: мне с..


Benbow пишет:

 цитата:
мне самому было бы интересно почитатоь бумаги по этому делу.



В качестве примера

Пункты обвинения суда, подготовленные Лестоком, и ответы на них Мэтьюза
(Вопросы и ответы даны в сокращенной форме)

Вопрос (обвинение) 1 - Почему в период 8-13 февраля, когда союзный флот был в виду, не были проведены консилиумы, что противоречит постоянной практике и является нарушением обязанностей?
- Ответ – Проведение консилиумов определяется исключительно командующим, и на этот счет нет никаких правил или приказов.

Вопрос 2 – Не были подняты соответствующие ночные приказы в ночь с 10 на 11 февраля; не был поднят ночной сигнал, в соответствии с которым первыми должны были ложиться в дрейф наиболее наветренные корабли или же держаться в сомкнутой линии, учитывая, что Британский флот спускался на пр-ка.

- Были подняты все необходимые сигналы, те же, что и я получал, плавая под командованием адмиралов Лика, Берклея и Бинга (Торрингтона); сигнал, чтобы наветренные корабли ложились первыми в дрейф не был необходим, если бы Лесток и его дивизион были в линии фронтом, как им и следовало бы быть, поскольку около них не было каких-либо иных кораблей, которые им могли бы в этом помешать.

Вопрос 3 – Утром 11-го Адмирал ушел вперед с центром, хотя дивизионы Вице- и Контр-адмиралов были в нескольких милях на ветре, и 1-й из них к тому же и за кормой; по этой причине эти дивизионы не имели времени приблизиться м сомкнуть линию баталии; расстояние между ними и центром увеличилось; центр продолжал идти за пр-ком, хотя Адмирал прислал сообщение Лестоку, что он будет его ожидать.

- Действительно, утром 11-го февраля дивизион Лестока был в 6 милях на ветре, а Роулей – немного на ветре и впереди; я не начал движение, пока Лесток также не поднял паруса и отнюдь не плыл таким образом, чтобы увеличить до них расстояние; напротив, рыскал своими кораблями вправо и влево, чтобы дать им время подойти; абсолютно отрицаю, что послал сообщение, указанное в обвинении.

Вопрос 4 – Утром 11-го флот не был построен в линию баталии в соответствии с сигналом, но центр при этом был отделен от двух других дивизионов; был дан сигнал вступить в бой, что представило пр-ку возможность вступить в бой в неблагоприятных для нас условиях, растянув нашу линию к югу и получив возможность выйти на ветер.

- Действительно, я поднял сигнал вступить в бой, но линия не была сформирована из-за поведения Лестока, который не приказал своим капитанам держаться на своих местах накануне ночью и продолжить плавание следующим утром (по признанию Лестока, он убрал лиселя, чтобы позволить Torbay'ю выйти вперед себя) ; и я не мог не отдать приказ вступить в бой, иначе пр-к мог вообще избежать боя; в то время французы все больше отрывались от нас вперед, а испанцы ставили все паруса, чтобы успеть уйти вслед за ними.

Вопросы 5 и 6 – Он атаковал пр-ка в противоречии со Статьей 19 Боевых инструкций, не построившись и в совершенно невыгодных условиях.

- Я придерживался этой статьи так долго, как это было в моих силах, и, наконец, мне оставалось или отойти от этой статьи, или же вообще отказаться от сражения по причине недостойного поведения Лестока; и мне представилось абсолютно необходимым вступить в бой в тех условиях, в которых я мог, в надежде ослабить пр-ка до того, как он успеет соединиться с Брестской эскадрой, приход которой ожидался в скором времени, что представило бы для нашего флота большую опасность; в результате юоя, мы все же предотвратили это соединение (Брестская эскадра под ком. Камильи, а затем Рошамбо, действительно шла в Левант, но позже).

Вопрос 7 – После начала сражения он задержал Marlborough, на которого нажимал пр-к; не послал ни одного корабля ему на помощь, что было в его силах, но уклонялся от боя вместе со своим дивизионом, в нарушение своего долга.

- Мой корабль был поврежден, и я счел целесообразным прибавить парусов и продвинуться вперед, оставив семь испанских кораблей дивизиону Лестока (Marlborough наваливался на меня, что было небезопасно, учитывая сильное волнение, и оба наши корабля могли столкнуться, мои грот-мачта и бушприт были прострелены, все 3 стеньги повреждены, топ бизани грозил упасть, реи прострелены, бегучий и стоячий такелаж изодраны); Адмирал не привязан к одному месту, но может менять позицию в зависимости от обстоятельств. Я приказал Dorsetshire помочь Marlborough, что тот исполнил и вступил в бой с Real'ом, после чего последний отвернул. Затем я представил Marlborough всю помощь, какая была в моих силах, хотя Marlborough и не поднимал сигнал «терплю бедствие» (некоторые свидетели утверждали, что Namur и Real в ходе сражения продолжали идти на юг и довольно быстро; поэтому замешкавшийся Marlborough и отстал, отставал и Лесток).

Вопрос 8 – Не более 5 испанских кораблей участвовали в сражении, три из которых были выведены из строя огнем Norfolk, Berwick и Marlborough, и хотя он имел в своем распоряжении остальной флот, чтобы уничтожить эти 5 кораблей, тем не менее он позволил четырем из них бежать, выйдя из боя с 14 ЛК, бывшими под его командой и не направив их в бой, и он не наказал и не сместил капитанов тех кораблей, которые уклонялись от боя.

- Сражались не 5 испанских кораблей, а 10; не понимаю утверждения в обвинении, что я мог располагать кораблями своего дивизиона, чтобы уничтожить эти 5 ЛК пр-ка, но обвиняю именно Лестока, который позволил этим 4 ЛК пр-ка бежать; я абсолютно отрицаю, что потворствовал какому-либо нарушению долга капитанами.

Вопрос 9 – Он направил брандер сжечь Real, не дав времени его капитану подготовить его для этой цели, не прикрыв или же проводив его до цели; из-за этой небрежности брандер был потерян, не причинив вреда пр-ку.

- Отрицаю все обвинение целиком, так как я в 9 утра того дня дал приказ капитану брандера подготовить его должным образом и поднял сигнал капитану Burrish'у (Dorsetshire) прикрыть его, но капитан брандера игнорировал сигнал и взорвал его слишком рано.

Вопрос 10 – Вскоре после гибели брандера он спустил сигнал «линия баталии» и поднял сигнал, отменяющий погоню, оставив пр-ку захваченный 60-пушечный ЛК с лейтенантом и 20 матросами; всю ночь с 11-го на 12-е он держался к ветру, стремясь избежать встречи с пр-ком и не выслав крейсерские суда для слежения за пр-ком, так что утром 12-го он оказался в 5-6 лигах на ветре от пр-ка.

- Мне пришлось привести к ветру, чтобы флот не пришел в расстройство, и приказать прекратить погоню, чтобы предотвратить разделение флота; потеря Poder'a была неизбежной, т.к. он был полностью выведен из строя, и не было ни ветра, ни времени, чтобы взять его на буксир; я вообще узнал, что этот ЛК был взят, не ранее утра следующего дня; я держался к северу между пр-ком и Тулоном; я не держался к ветру с целью избежать пр-ка; я не высылал крейсера из опасения, что их может захватить ап-к, т.к. его суда были очищены, а мои имели обросшие днища.

Вопрос 11 – 12-го, преследуя отступавшего пр-ка, шедшего не в линии баталии, и увидев впереди себя испанцев, под ветром от французов, 4 из них (в т.ч. Real шедший на буксире) были повреждены, ночь была лунная, погода благоприятная, Британский флот на ветре и был в виду пр-ка, но они (отставшие испанцы) были все хуже различимы, он мог прибавить парусов или же убавить, чтобы собрать свой флот, но вместо этого он лег в дрейф на ночь, что способствовало бегству пр-ка.

- Согласен, что 12-го во время погони большая часть испанцев были под ветром от французов, и они не были в правильном строю; испанский адмирал шел на буксире, Poder был выведен из строя, но сверх этого ничего больше не было; погоня была прекращена, но когда я выслал вперед корабль, французы повернули назад и пошли к испанцам; в то время от меня до них было 4 лиги; некоторые мои корабли были повреждены и, будучи у меня за кормой, никак не могли меня нагнать, все – с обросшими днищами; в течение всего дня я очень мало выиграл в дистанции с пр-ком; в этих условиях я решил, что будет лучше лечь в дрейф, чтобы избежать ухода к Гибралтару и не уходить далеко от берегов Италии, которую он был должен, в соответствии с приказами, защищать, что было не менее важно, чем уничтожение союзного флота; было необходимо противостоять грозным планам высадки больших десантов Францией и Испанией в Италии, о чем я получил сообщение от английского посла в Париже через герцога Ньюкасла.

Вопрос 12 – Когда Британский флот 12-го приблизился к пр-ку, пр-к бросил Poder 60, захваченный Berwick'ом и отбитый пр-ком, он послал капитана Норриса сжечь его, тогда как он мог быть сохранен для использования на службе Короля, направив его под эскортом фрегата на Менорку, особенно учитывая, что многие его части были в хорошем состоянии и его фок- и бизань мачты уцелели (но французы, бросив Poder, подожгли его; Норрис только добавил огня!).

- Я действительно мог сохранить его, что было бы выгодно и лично мне, но я не мог выделить для него эскорт и моряков, т.к. на флоте была острая нехватка экипажей и припасов.

Вопрос 13 – 13-го он прекратил погоню, когда Лесток просигналил, что видит 20 кораблей пр-ка, и одновременно с эти он быстро приближался к пр-ку, будучи на ветре и используя шквал, так что пр-к должен был принять бой или бросить свои поврежденные суда.

- Я действительно видел сигнал Лестока, но не помню кол-ва указанных им кораблей;; я прежде велел ему послать в погоню часть его кораблей. Возможно, Лесток и сближался с ними, но я утверждаю, что на моем корабле никто не видел пр-ка, даже с грот-марса, но даже если бы мы их и увидели с грот-мачты, то я все равно отменил бы преследование по вышеуказанным причинам.

Вопросы 14 и 15 – Он виновен в многочисленных нарушениях долга и был главным виновником неудачи Британского флота.

- Ничего не нарушил и докажу, что не я был виновником этой неудачи.

По окончании процесса Мэтьюз попросил протоколы суда, но ему предложили обращаться к Лордам Адмиралтейства. (Полный текст решения суда по Мэтьюзу так никогда нигде и не был опубликован).



Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
администратор


Сообщение: 266
Зарегистрирован: 09.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 17.06.08 22:31. Заголовок: По Кеппелю - насколь..


По Кеппелю - насколько подробно разобран этот эпизод у Танстолла?
Судя по вашему посту в теме про Орвилье - Кеппель действительно допустил большие ошибки в планировании боем.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 272
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 18.06.08 14:31. Заголовок: Benbow пишет: По Ке..


Benbow пишет:

 цитата:
По Кеппелю - насколько подробно разобран этот эпизод у Танстолла?



Вообще, изучать историю тактики по Танстоллу нельзя, у него - история прогресса систем морских сигналов с примерами из тактики. Описания сражений - разные по объему, сведения часто - устаревшие, бой у Минорки вообще изложен кратко и неточно.

Описание сражения при Уэссане - очень подробное, но сумбурное, изложено как-то фрагментарно, ошибки в переводе, на стр. 233 сказано, что англичанам было трудно прицеливаться, т.к. они были с наветренной стороны, но они были как раз под ветром. И - "как только он увидел, что его авангард почти уничтожил арьергард англичан(?)", вместо "прошел арьергард", перепутаны надписи под портретами адмиралов - Кеппел - на стр. 226 (1765 г.), Орвиллье - на стр. 225. Пзже я добавлю описание этого сражения по другим источникам.

Benbow пишет:

 цитата:
Судя по вашему посту в теме про Орвилье - Кеппель действительно допустил большие ошибки в планировании боем.



Я этого не утверждал, и это никак не следует из мооего поста. Арьергард отстал по причине некомпетентности и неопытности Пеллисера - члена Адмиралтейства, не имевшего опыта управления эскадрами (как и Лесток в 1744 г.). Все действия Кеппела были правильными, Клоуз (Clowes) упрекает его в том, что он слишком поздно призвал к себе корабли арьергарда Пеллисера.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
администратор


Сообщение: 276
Зарегистрирован: 09.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 28.06.08 14:37. Заголовок: Эд пишет: зже я доб..


Эд пишет:

 цитата:
зже я добавлю описание этого сражения по другим источникам.


Эд, если есть возможность, так все же что там было?

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 278
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 29.06.08 17:15. Заголовок: Benbow пишет: что т..


Benbow пишет:

 цитата:
что там было?



Сражение при Уэссане 1778 г., обычно упоминаемое вскользь историками по причине отсутствия потерь (обычная обывательская точка зрения), интересно тем, что французы, имевшие меньшие силы, искусно маневрировали и не позволили англичанам использовать их преимущества, при этом они могли добиться и большего успеха.

Ниже – описание у Clowes, III (Штенцель использовал его схемы):

The Brest fleet also put to sea, the day before Keppel, under the
command of Admiral the Comte d'Orvilliers. It contained thirty-
two ships of the line. Of these, three a sixty-four, a sixty, and a
fifty were not considered fit for the line of battle, which was thus
reduced to twenty-nine sail, carrying 2,098 guns. To these the
British opposed an aggregate of 2,278 ; but comparison by this means
only is very rough. Not only the sizes of the guns, but the classes
and weight of the vessels need to be considered. In the particular
instance the matter is of little importance ; the action being inde-
cisive, and credit depending upon mameuvres rather than upon
fighting. (Накануне сражения 2 фр. ЛК разминулись с флотом, и у Орвилье осталось 27 ЛК в линии + 3 слабых (с 18ф пушками на гон-деке) за линией.

The French admiral was hampered by vacillating instructions,
reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry.
Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that lie must avoid action,
unless under very favourable circumstances. At the moment of
sailing he wrote;: "Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, I
will not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless bv positive orders, until
I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instructions, and
known to all the captains. Till then I will not llv before Admiral
Keppel, whatever his strength ; only, if ! know him to be too
superior, I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can; but
if the enemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to -him."
These words explain his conduct throughout the next few days.

On the afternoon of July 2nd the two fleets sighted each other,
about a hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to
leeward. Towards sunset, the latter were standing south-west, with
the wind at west-north-west, and bore north-east from the British,
who were lying-to, heads to the northward. The latter remaining
nearly motionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting,
d'Orvilliers availed himself of the conditions to press to windward,
and in the morning was found to bear north-west from his opponent. 1
Their relative positions satisfied for the moment both admirals;
for Keppel found himself interposed between Brest and the French,
while d'Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open
retreat to his port, had made it possible, by getting the weather-gage,
to fulfil his promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of
his ships, however, the Due de Bourgogne, 80, and a seventy-four,
were still to leeward, not only of their own main body, but also of
the British. Keppel sent chasers after them, for the expressed pur-
pose of compelling d'Orvilliers to action in their support, 1 and it was
believed by the British that they were forced to return to Brest, to
avoid being cut off. They certainly quitted their fleet, which was
thus reduced to twenty-seven effective sail. From this time until
July 27th the wind continued to the westward, and the wariness of
the French admiral baffled all Keppel's efforts to get within range.
The latter, having no doubts as to what was expected of him, pur-
sued vigorously, watching his chance.

On the morning of the 27th the two fleets were from six to ten
miles apart, wind west-south-west, both on the port tack, steering
north-west, the French dead to windward. The latter were in line
ahead, the British in bow-and-quarter line ; that is, nearly abreast
each other, but so ranged that, it' they went about together, they
should have been in line ahead. Moth fleets were irregularly formed,
the British especially so; for Keppel rightly considered that he
would not accomplish his purpose, it' he were pedantic concerning
the order of his going. He had therefore signalled a "General
Chase," which, bv permitting much individual freedom of movement,
facilitated the progress of the whole. At daylight, the division com-
manded by Sir Hugh Palliser the right wing, as then heading -
had dropped astern ; and at f>.30 A. M. the signal was made to seven
of its fastest sailors to chase to windward, the object being so to
place them, relatively to the main body, as to support the latter, if
an opportunity for action should offer.

At l A. M. the French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy
and to see more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession. to
countermarch. As the van ships went round under this signal, they
had to steer off the wind, parallel to their former line, on which
those following them still were, until they reached the rear ship,
when they could again haul to the wind. This caused a loss of
ground to leeward, but not more than d'Orvilliers could afford, as
things stood. Just after he had fairly committed himself to the
maneuuvre, the wind hauled to the southward two points, 2 which
favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards the
enemy. Keppel therefore continued on the port tack, until all the
French were on the starboard, and at 10.15, being nearly in their
wake, he ordered his own ships to tack together. At this moment a
thick rain-squall came up, concealing the fleets one from another for
three quarters of an hour. With the squall the wind shifted back,
favouring the British on this tack, as it had on the other, and en-
abling them to lay up for the enemy's rear. When the weather cleared,
at 11, the French were seen to have gone about again, and were still
in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre. Their admiral had
doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and from the direction
of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter could not be
avoided. If lie continued on the starboard tack, the van of the
pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be misun-
derstood, would overtake his ships, engaging as many of them
as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the
columns would meet, and the Heels pass in opposite directions, on
equal terms as regarded position. Therefore he had ordered his
ships to go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again
rapidly, but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.

Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did
he now. Recognising that his enemy was avoiding action, he judged correctly that lie should force it, even at some risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade.
Besides, thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to
chase, these, forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he
was advancing, were now well to windward, able therefore to sup-
port their comrades, if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In
short, practically the whole force was coming into action, although
much less regularly than might have been desired. What was to
follow was a rough-and-ready fight, but it was all that could be had,
and better than nothing. Keppel therefore simply made the signal
for battle, and that just as the firing began. The collision was so
sudden that the ships at first had not their colours flying.

The French also, although their maneuvres had been more
methodical, were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of
thirty ships, of varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement
in a fortnight of sea practice. The change of wind had precipitated
f.n action, which one admiral had been seeking, and the other shun-
ning; but each had to meet it with such shift as he could. The
British being close-hauled, the French, advancing on a parallel line,
were four points l off the wind. Most of their ships, therefore, could
have gone clear to windward of their opponents, but the fact that
the latter could reach some of the leaders compelled the others to
support them. As d'Orvilliers had said, it was hard to avoid an
enemy resolute to fight. The leading three French vessels l hauled
their wind, in obedience to the admiral's signal to form the line of
battle, which means a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to
draw them gradually away from the British, and, if imitated by their
followers, to render the affair a mere touch at a single point inde-
cisive. The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire soon
after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by under
short canvas, firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily much
handicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy,
and caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside.
" The distance between the Formidable, 90, and the Egmont, 74, was
so short," testified Captain John Laforey, whose three-decker, the
Ocean, 90, was abreast and outside this interval, " that it was witli
difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage, without firing upon
them, and I was once very near on board the Egmont." The Formid-
able, Palliser's flagship, kept her mizzen topsail aback much of the
time, to deaden her way, to make room for the Ocean, and to allow
the ships behind her to close. "At a quarter past one," testified
Captain Maitland of the Elizabeth, 74, " we were very close behind
the Formidable, and a midshipman upon the poop called out that there
was a ship coming on board on the weather bow. I put the helm
up, . . . and found, when the smoke cleared away, I was shot up
under the Formidable & lee. She was then engaged with the two
last ships in the French fleet, and, as I could not fire at them without firing through the Formidable, I was obliged to shoot on." ! Captain Bazely, of the Formidable, says of the same incident, "The Formidable” did at the time of action bear up to one of the enemy's ships, to avoid being aboard of her, whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the Formidable. I thought we could not
avoid being on board."

Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in
killed and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of

1 Chevalier says, p. 89, " The English passed out of range " of these ships. As these ships had the wind, they had the choice of range, barring signals from their
own admiral. In truth, they were obeying his order.

2 This evidence of the captains of the Ocean and the Elizabeth contradicts Palliser's
charge that his ship was not adequately supported.

the other two. 1 This was due to the morning signal to chase to
windward, which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As
soon as the British van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its
commander, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, anticipating Keppel's
wishes, signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 1, V).
As the French column was running free, these ships, when about,
fetched to windward of its wake. As the Victory drew out of the
fire, at 1 P.M., Keppel made a similar signal, and attempted to wear,
the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking ; but caution was
needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it
was not till 2 P.M., that the Victory was about on the other tack,
heading after the French. At this time, 2 P.M., just before or just
after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down, and that for

1 It was actually quite equal, but this was due to an accidental explosion on
board the Fnrmiilnble.

the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latter was to
re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly because no
longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict the urgent
call for a re-formation. 1

At this time six or seven of Harland's division were on the
weather bow of the Victory, to windward (westward), but a little
ahead, and standing like her after the French ; all on the port tack
(Fig. 1). None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flag-
ship at once (Fig. 1, C). At 2.80 Palliser's ship, the Formidable,
on the starboard tack passed her to leeward, the last of the fleet
apparently out of action (Fig. 1, R). A half-hour after this the
Victory had been joined by three of the centre, which were following
her in close order, the van remaining in the same relative position.
Astern of these two groups were a number of other ships in various
degrees of confusion, some going about, some trying to come up,
others completely disabled. Especially, there was in the south-south-
east, therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or five British vessels,
evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring.

This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral,
scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of the
British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through
the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated
in the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of a
military exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped.
The French, starting from a better formation, had come out in better
shape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the dis-
advantage of a policy essentially defensive ; and d'Orvilliers' next
order, though well conceived, was resultless. At 1 P.M. J he sig-
nalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle on
the starboard tack (Fig. 1, F). This signal was not seen by the
leading ship, which should have begun the movement. The junior
French admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went
about, and spoke the Bretagne, to know what was the commander-
in-chief's desire. D'Orvilliers explained that he wished to pass along
the enemy's fleet from end to end, to leeward, because in its dis-
ordered state there was a fair promise of advantage, and by going
to leeward presenting his weather side to the enemy he could
use the weather lower-deck guns, whereas, in the then state of the
sea, the let' ports could not be opened. Thus explained, the move-
ment was executed, but the favourable moment had passed. It was
not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre was evident to the British.

As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent's intention, he wore
the Victory again, a few minutes after 3 P.M., and stood slowly
down, on the starboard tack off the wind, towards his crippled ships
in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of battle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station (Fig. 2, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy, Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight, a preposterous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at once and joined the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the Victory, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell in behind her, to
cover the rear until Palliser's division could repair damage and take
their places. At 4 P.M. Harland's division was in the line. Palli-
ser's ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves in rear
of the Formidable, their captains considering, as they testified, that
they took station from their divisional commander, and not from
the ship of the commander-in-chief. There was formed thus, on the
weather quarter of the Victory, and a mile or two distant, a separate
line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear of the fleet,
and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig. 2, R). At
5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten into
the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the
French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not at-
tacked, as they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee
of the British, their van abreast the latter's centre. At the same
time Harland was directed to move to his proper position in the van,
which he at once did (Fig. 2, V). Palliser made no movement, and
Keppel with extraordinary if not culpable forbearance, refrained
from summoning the rear ships into line by their individual pennants.
This he at last did about 7 P.M., signalling specifically to each of the vessels then grouped with Palliser (except the Formidable), to leave the latter and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly done, but it was thought then to be too late to renew the action.
At daylight the next morning, only three French ships were in sight
from the decks ; but the main body could be seen in the south-east
from some of the mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to
twenty miles distant.

Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish ;
the British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the
French 161 killed and 513 wounded. The general result would
appear to indicate that the French, in accordance with their usual
policy, had fired to cripple their enemy's spars and rigging, the
motive-power. This would be consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed
purpose of avoiding action except under favourable circumstances.
As the smoke thickened and confusion increased, the fleets had got
closer together, and, whatever the intention, many shot found their
way to the British hulls. Nevertheless, as the returns show, the
French hit were to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand,
it is certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the
action was greater than that of the British.

Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of
honour, or (if credit, for material advantage accrued to neither.
Keppel had succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his
will; d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superi-
ority of manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next
signal been promptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the
British fleet, in fairly good order, before it re-formed, and concen-
trated his fire on the more leewardly of its vessels. Even under the
delay, it was distinctly in his power to renew the fight ; and that
he did not do so forfeits all claim to victory. Not to speak of
the better condition of the French ships, Keppel, by running off
the wind, had given his opponent full opportunity to reach his fleet
and to attack. Instead of so doing, d'Orvilliers drew up under the
British lee, out of range, and offered battle ; a gallant defiance, but to a crippled foe.

Time was thus given to the British to refit their ships sufficiently
to bear down again. This the French admiral should not have per-
mitted. He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated ;
to windward, or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the
conditions, it was not good generalship to give the enemy time, and
to await his pleasure. Keppel, on the other hand, being granted
this chance, should have renewed the fight ; and here arose the con-
troversy which set all England by the ears, and may be said to have
immortalised this otherwise trivial incident. Palliser's division was
to windward from 4 to 7 P.M., while the signals were flying to form
line of battle, and to bear down in the Admiral's wake ; and Keppel
alleged that, had these been obeyed by 6 P.M., he would have re-
newed the battle, having still over two hours of daylight. It has
been stated already that, besides the signals, a frigate brought Palliser word that the Admiral was waiting only for him.

The immediate dispute is of slight present interest, except as an
historical link in the fighting development of the British Navy; and
only this historical significance justifies more than a passing mention.
In 1778 men's minds were still full of Byng's execution in 1757, and
of the Mathews and Lestock affair in 1744, which had materially in-
fluenced Byng's action off Minorca. Keppel repeatedly spoke of him-
self as on trial for his life ; and he had been a member of Byng's
court-martial. The gist of the charges against him, preferred by
Palliser, was that he attacked in the first instance without properly
forming his line, for which Mathews had been cashiered : and, sec-
ondly, that by not renewing the action after the first pass-by, and by
wearing away from the French fleet, lie had not done his utmost to
''take, sink, burn, and destroy" the latter, the charge on which
Byng was shot. Keppel, besides his justifying reasons for his course
in general, alleged and proved his full intention to attack again, had
not Palliser failed to come into line, a delinquency the same as that
of Lestock, which caused Mathews's ruin.

In other words, men's minds were breaking away from, but had
not thrown off completely, the tyranny of the Order of Battle, one
of the worst of tyrannies, because founded on truth. Absolute error,
like a whole lie, is open to speedy detection ; half-truths are troublesome. The Order of Battle was an admirable servant and a most
objectionable despot. Mathews, in despair over a recalcitrant second,
cast off the yoke, engaged with part of his force, was ill supported,
and cashiered ; Lestock escaping. Byng, considering this, and being
a pedant by nature, would not break his line ; the enemy slipped
away, Minorca surrendered, and he was shot. In Keppel's court-
martial, twenty-eight out of the thirty captains who had been in
the line were summoned as witnesses. Most 01 them swore that if
Keppel had chased in line of battle that day, there could have been
no action, and the majority of them cordially approved ; but there
was evidently an undercurrent still of dissent, and especially in the
rear ships, where there had been some of the straggling inevitable in
such movements, and whose commanders therefore had uncomfortable
experience of the lack of mutual support, which the line of battle was
meant to insure.

Another indication of still surviving pedantry was the obligation
felt in the rear ships to take post behind their own admiral, and to
remain there when the signals for the line of battle, and to bear down
in the admiral's wake, were flying. Thus Palliser's own inaction, to
whatever cause due, paralysed the six or eight sail with him ; but it
appears to the writer that Keppel was seriously remiss in not sum-
moning those ships by their own pennants, as soon as he began to
distrust the purposes of the Vice-Admiral, instead of delaying doing
so till 7 P. M., as lie did. It is a curious picture presented to us by the evidence. The Commander-in-Chief, with his staff and the cap-
tain of the ship, fretting and fuming on the Victory's quarter-deck ;
the signals flying which have been mentioned ; Harland's division
getting into line ahead ; and four points on the weather quarter, only
two miles distant, so that "every gun and port could be counted," a
group of seven or eight sail, among them the flag of the third in com-
mand, apparently indifferent spectators. The Formidable 1 & only sign
of disability was the foretopsail unbent for four hours, a delay which, being unexplained, rather increased than relieved suspicion, rife then throughout the Navy. Palliser was a Tory, and had left the Board of Admiralty to take his command. Keppel was so strong a Whig
that he would not serve against the Americans ; and he evidently
feared that he was to be betrayed to his ruin.

Palliser's defence rested upon three principal points : (1), that the
signal for the line of battle was not seen on board the formidable ;
(2), that the signal to get into the Admiral's wake was repeated by
himself ; (3), that his foremast was wounded, and. moreover, found to
be in such bad condition that he feared to carry sail on it. As re-
gards the first, the signal was seen on board the Ocean, next astern
of and "not far from" : the Formidable ; for the second, the Admiral
should have been informed of a disability by which a single ship was
neutralising a division. The frigate that brought Keppel's message
could have carried back this. Thirdly, the most damaging feature to
Palliser's case was that he asserted that, after coming out from under
fire, be wore at once towards the enemy ; afterwards he wore back
again. A ship that thus wore twice before three o'clock, might have
displayed zeal and efficiency enough to run two miles, off the wind, 1
at five, to support a fight. Deliberate treachery is impossible. To the writer the Vice-Admiral's behaviour seems that of a man in a sulk,
who will do only that which he can find no excuses for neglecting.
In such cases of sailing close, men generally slip over the line into
grievous wrong.

Keppel was cleared of all the charges preferred against him ; the
accuser had not thought best to embody among them the delay to
recall the ships which lie himself was detaining. Against Palliser
no specific charge was preferred, but the Admiralty directed a gen-
eral inquiry into his course on the 27th of July. The court found
his conduct " in many instances highly exemplary and meritorious,"
he had fought well, " but reprehensible in not having acquainted
the Commander-in-Chief of his distress, which he might have done
either by the Fox, or other means which he had in his power."
Public opinion running strongly for Keppel, his acquittal was cele-
brated with bonfires and illuminations in London; the mob got
drunk, smashed the windows of Palliser's friends, wrecked Palliser' s
own house, and came near to killing Palliser himself. The Admiralty,
in 1780, made him Governor of Greenwich Hospital.

On the 28th of July, the British and French being no longer in
sight of each other, Keppel, considering his fleet too injured aloft to cruise near the French coast, kept away for Plymouth, where ho
arrived on the 31st. Before putting to sea again, he provided against
a recurrence of the misdemeanour of the 27th by a general order, that
" in future the Line is always to be taken from the Centre." Had
this been in force before, Palliser's captains would have taken station by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Formidable would have been left to windward by herself. At the same time Howe was closing his
squadron upon the centre in America ; and Rodney, two years later,
experienced the ill-effects of distance taken from the next ahead, when the leading ship of a fleet disregarded an order.

Although privately censuring Palliser's conduct, the Commander-
in-Chief made no official complaint, and it was not until the matter got into the papers, through the talk of the fleet, that the difficulty began which resulted in the trial of both officers, early in the following year.

After this, Keppel, being dissatisfied with the Admiralty's treatment,
intimated his wish to give up the command. The order to strike his
flag was dated March 18th, 1779. He was not employed afloat again,
but upon the change of administration in 1782 he became First Lord
of the Admiralty, and so remained, with a brief intermission, until
December, 1783.

It is perhaps necessary, to mention that both British and French
asserted, and assert to this day, that the other party abandoned the
field. 1 The point is too trivial, in the author's opinion, to warrant
further discussion of an episode whose historical interest is very
slight, though its professional lessons are valuable. The British case
has the advantage through the courts-martial of the sworn testi-
mony of twenty to thirty captains, who agreed that the British kept
on the same tack under short sail throughout the night, and that
in the morning only three French ships were visible. As far as
known to the author, the French contention rests only on the usual
reports.

У меня есть обе линии баталии в сражении с указанием потерь по кораблям.



Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
администратор


Сообщение: 388
Зарегистрирован: 09.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 18.10.08 09:09. Заголовок: Кстати, а есть ли у ..


Кстати, а есть ли у кого материалы по самому громкому нашему судебному процессу?
Речь идет о слушаниях в январе-феврале 1789 года о действиях капитанов Коковцева, Баранова и Вальронда во время Готландского сражения.
Кстати, там тоже изначально были рчень суровые приговоры, и хотя императрица смягчила их - они остались довольно суровыми. Разжалование в матросы навечно, лишение орденов, увольнение со службы без пенсиона....

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 393
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 1
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 18.10.08 12:07. Заголовок: Ал. Соколов, Гогланд..


Ал. Соколов, Гогландское сражение, статья в «Мор. Сб.», № 5, 1849 г. (Неофиц. отдел) (изложение хоть и архаично, но включает многие важные подробности)

«…Первый корабль «Болеслав» вскоре поворотило по ветру (от повреждений), и он прошел между обеих линий и привел к ветру на прежний галс в арьергардии. 2-й корабль «Иоанн Богослов» через полчаса боя получил подводную пробоину, вода поднялась на 45 дюймов, многие снасти были перебиты, и он кинулся к ветру. Был послан катер – забуксировать нос, но вскоре он был разбит ядрами, другие гребные – тоже повреждены; он сам собою поворотился против ветра ниже других, миновав ближайшего «Всеслава», он все же поднялся к ветру выше своей линии и около часа оставался на этом галсе, вне выстрелов, так как, как говорил капитан, поворотить против ветра не мог, а для поворота по ветру – тесно, и - встретил шведский корабль и, положив грот-марсель на стеньгу, стал с ним биться на противных галсах. Было весьма тихо (Командир, капитан Валронт, был обвинен в том, что, выйдя на ветер своей линии, не прибавлял парусов (имея одни марсели), почему и не мог выйти на простор, где можно поворотить; показание же его о битве на разных галсах, будто бы продолжавшейся до самого окончания дела, не принято за вероятное. Суд приговорил Валронта к смертной казни, а по конфирмации (конфирмации по этим делам подписывала сама Екатерина) он написан в наши матросы (без выслуги, в ЧФ).

Третий корабль, «Всеслав», по уходе передних двух, бился с тремя неприятельскими кораблями, перед концом битвы принудил их спуститься, и сам, имея большие повреждения, выбуксировался за линию, к арьергардии.

Адмирал, бывший на корабле «Ростислав», в кордебаталии, сначала дрался с генерал-адмиральским кораблем, но через полчаса, будучи осаживаем «Мстиславом», который все пятился назад, наполнил грот-марсель, взял луф (вышел на ветер) и, обойдя два передние его корабля, вступил в линию между кораблями «Петр» и «Елена».

Переходим к арьергардии: самый задний корабль, «Дерись», еще не дойдя на выстрел, из опасения быть поставленным в два огня, поворотил на другой галс и вовсе не участвовал в битве (Командир этого корабля, капитан Коковцев, за это и за то, что не подал помощи кораблю «Владислав», был разжалован в матросы навечно (это – по конфирмации, а по суду сперва – к «лишению живота»). Второй с зада, «Память Евстафия», два часа дрался против трех кораблей, но, имея много подводных пробоин, отчего вода возвысилась до 60 дюймов, и значительные повреждения в вооружении, тоже вышел за линию (Командир, капитан Баранов, обвиненный в том, что не испытывал средств заделать пробоины на месте битвы, - впрочем не считая это упущение важным, ибо нашлись три пробоины, которых не было никакой возможности заделать на месте, - по суду приговорен к разжалованию в рядовые на месяц, а по конфирмации выключен из службы с тем, чтобы впредь никуда не принимать). Корабль «Владислав», более всех других потерпевший от повреждений, совсем упал под ветр, был обстреливаем с носу, с кормы и с бортов; и только в 10 часу вечера, имея убитыми и ранеными 257 человек, капитан Берх, по совету с офицерами, решился сдаться. Бывший в крюйт-камере у раздачи картузов, мичман Смирнов, имел в готовности бочку пороху и зажженный фитиль, чтобы взорваться, если прикажут, но капитан пожалел бесплодно губить людей. Команда была на все готова. Когда ей объявили о намерении сдаться, отвечала единогласно: «Отец наш, делай, что хочешь, мы отдаемся тебе в полную власть!». (Рапорт Берха, при сем прилагаемый (в конце). (Берх по суду был оправдан).


Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
администратор


Сообщение: 438
Зарегистрирован: 09.11.07
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 21.12.08 16:17. Заголовок: Вопрос по братьями Ф..


Вопрос по братьями Фондезиным. А почему их не выкинули с флота после русско-щведской компании?
Вроде как Екатерина грозилась это сделать.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 486
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 1
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 22.12.08 13:27. Заголовок: Benbow пишет: почем..


Benbow пишет:

 цитата:
почему их не выкинули с флота после русско-щведской компании?



Е2: "тот виноват перед Отечеством, кто обоих Фондезинов в адмиралы вел".
Ну, а откуда других взять? После 1788-89 гг. оба пошли по береговым должностям. при Паше1 оба опять всплыли: Виллим сменил Мордвинова на посту гл. начальника ЧФ, был введен в Комитет по образованию флота (1803), Мартын - нач. Архангельского порта, по донесению Кроуна о слабой постройке арханг. кораблей (1812) был отрешен от должности (после следствия).

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 213
Зарегистрирован: 13.03.08
Откуда: Deutschland, Wiesbaden
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.01.09 22:25. Заголовок: Benbow пишет: Разжа..


Benbow пишет:

 цитата:
Разжалование в матросы навечно, лишение орденов, увольнение со службы без пенсиона....



И долго они прослужили матросами?

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 214
Зарегистрирован: 13.03.08
Откуда: Deutschland, Wiesbaden
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.01.09 22:42. Заголовок: Эд пишет: Особый ин..


Эд пишет:

 цитата:
Особый интерес представляют три процесса 18 века - над Мэтьюсом, Бингом и Кеппелом.



Мне очень интересны, есть ли результаты суда над Байроном за Гренаду, но ещё больше по Грейвсу за Чезапик. Ведь это сражение имело для Англии эпохальное значение. Именно неудача в нём привела к капитуляции армии Корнваллиса и в итоге потери всех Североамериканских колоний. Странно, что после этого он оказывается 2-м флагманом у Хоу "Славного 1-го июня".
Ещё вопрос по французам. Как поступили с капитанами де ла Клю, ушедшими в Кадис? С д´Эстеном за Санта-Люсию? С де Гишеном за второй Уэшант? С капитанами Сюффрена, отстранёнными им от командования кораблями?
Удивляет, что де Кура за Тулон отстранили от командования, а бездарного Наварро наградили титулом маркиза. Французы тоже не всегда были последовательны в своих решениях. Отстранение Форбэна - идиотизм. Суд над Лабурдонне - полный произвол. И предел всему - суд над Лалли-Толандалем. Расправа в стиле суда над Бингом!

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 215
Зарегистрирован: 13.03.08
Откуда: Deutschland, Wiesbaden
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.01.09 22:43. Заголовок: Эд пишет: Е2: "..


Эд пишет:

 цитата:
Е2: "тот виноват перед Отечеством, кто обоих Фондезинов в адмиралы вел".



Она взяла вину на себя?

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 550
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 1
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 16.01.09 18:00. Заголовок: Leon пишет: Она взя..


Leon пишет:

 цитата:
Она взяла вину на себя?



Она имела в виду тех, кто их рекомендовал.

Leon пишет:

 цитата:
есть ли результаты суда над Байроном за Гренаду, но ещё больше по Грейвсу за Чезапик.



Нет, по этим сражениям судов не было, но Байрону больше не давали командование за излишнюю горячность. Грэвз же был очень милостиво принят в Англии, в т.ч. и королем. Хотя сражение при Линн-Хэйвене (или Чезапике) очень похоже на Миноркское 1756 (и по результатм тоже).

Leon пишет:

 цитата:
Как поступили с капитанами де ла Клю, ушедшими в Кадис? С д´Эстеном за Санта-Люсию? С де Гишеном за второй Уэшант? С капитанами Сюффрена, отстранёнными им от командования кораблями?



По этим эпизодам судов не было. Смещение капитанов Сюффреном было утверждено королем, причем часть их "вышибли со службы вон, без пенсий". Но это был редкий случай, видимо, сыграли роль сражения Сюффрена. Иногда наказанием быа задержка в продвижении по служебной лестнице, рекомендации не предоставлять независимого командования. Де Грасс обвинил несколько своих капитанов в "неоказании ему помощи". Капитаны получили указанные слабые наказания. Суд постановил, что поражение было вызвано объективными причинами.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 223
Зарегистрирован: 13.03.08
Откуда: Deutschland, Wiesbaden
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 16.01.09 18:29. Заголовок: Эд пишет: Грэвз же ..


Эд пишет:

 цитата:
Грэвз же был очень милостиво принят в Англии, в т.ч. и королем. Хотя сражение при Линн-Хэйвене (или Чезапике) очень похоже на Миноркское 1756 (и по результатм тоже).



Необъяснимо!!!
Потеря Америки болезненнее потери Минорки. Которую к тому же быстро вернули.
Кстати почему у Грейвса старшинство перед Худом? Оба контр-адмиралы с 1780.

Эд пишет:

 цитата:
По этим эпизодам судов не было.



Как на счёт трусливых капитанов де ла Клю?
Неужели Гишену простили 2-й Уэшант? Разгром конвоя 12-ю кораблями Кемпенфельда на глазах 17 конвоиров. Или тамм тоже учли "объективные причины"?

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 551
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 1
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 16.01.09 18:51. Заголовок: Leon пишет: Как на ..


Leon пишет:

 цитата:
Как на счёт трусливых капитанов де ла Клю?



Это не имело последствий. Пострадал 2-й капитан Орифлама 50 лейтенант Фрамон, но не тогда, а позже, в 1784 г., за то, что "безрассудно" пошел на Катоне 64 и допустил, что его захватил Худ (вместе с Язоном) уже после Доминики. Фрамон был уже капитан и граф, но с ним обошлись очень сурово и заключили в замок Гам, где он и умер в 1785 г. Может, их король был очень разгневан этой сдачей, как наш - Небогатовым. Прочие 5 франц. ЛК сдались в бою, после упорного сопротивления, расстреляв все боеприпасы.
Вообще, по 7-летней войне после Киберона Конфлан "покинул флот". 2-й командир при Кибероне - Боффрамон, бежавший на юг, был произведен в генерал-лейтенанты не в 1762 г. (как предполагалось), а в 1764 г.
Вообще, во французском флоте обычно были не суды, а "оргвыводы".

Leon пишет:

 цитата:
Неужели Гишену простили 2-й Уэшант?



За это ничего не последовало. Но общество было очень недовольно им за 1781 г.: тогда союзный флот (30 ЛК Кордовы) и 19 ЛК Гишена стояли перед о. Уайт, за которым укрылся вице-адм. Дарби, имевший вдвое меньше ЛК. Гишен предлагал атаковать его, но почти все, в т.ч. и главком Кордова были против. Тем не менее Гишена освистали в театре,хотя его сопровождал в ложу брат короля (будущий Карл Х).

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 552
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 1
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 16.01.09 18:57. Заголовок: Leon пишет: де Кура..


Leon пишет:

 цитата:
де Кура за Тулон отстранили от командования



Немного не так, испанцы жаловались, что де Кур плохо их поддержал, ради союзника командование временно передали Габарэ, де Куру было 78, он съехал на берег "подлечиться", но затем Габарэ умер, нового главкома не назничили, флот был разделен на дивизионы для крейсерской войны.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 227
Зарегистрирован: 13.03.08
Откуда: Deutschland, Wiesbaden
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 16.01.09 19:06. Заголовок: Эд пишет: ради союз..


Эд пишет:

 цитата:
ради союзника командование временно передали Габарэ



Это не тот Габарэ, что был младшим флагманом у Турвилля nри Барфлёре? Или столько не живут?

Эд пишет:

 цитата:
нового главкома не назничили, флот был разделен на дивизионы для крейсерской войны.



Кстати о главкомах, кто был в-адм. Пенаннта в войну за австрийское наследство?


Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 228
Зарегистрирован: 13.03.08
Откуда: Deutschland, Wiesbaden
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 16.01.09 19:16. Заголовок: Эд пишет: Прочие 5 ..


Эд пишет:

 цитата:
Прочие 5 франц. ЛК сдались в бою, после упорного сопротивления, расстреляв все боеприпасы.



Я имел в виду не этих, а тех 5 капитанов, кто отделился от де ла Клю и бежал ночью в Кадис. Танстолл правда их оправдывает неточными сигналами де ла Клю. Но с этой точки зрения Лалли-Толандаля судить вообще не за что.
А Лабурдоннэ надо было наградить в зале суда и произвести в вице-адмиралы. За что он получил 3 года? За взятие Мадраса?

Эд пишет:

 цитата:
2-й командир при Кибероне - Боффрамон, бежавший на юг, был произведен в генерал-лейтенанты не в 1762 г. (как предполагалось), а в 1764 г.
Вообще, во французском флоте обычно были не суды, а "оргвыводы".



При таких наказаниях понятно, почему никто из капитанов не пришёл на выручку де Грассу.Они свой риск соизмеряли!

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 556
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 1
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 16.01.09 19:46. Заголовок: Leon пишет: При так..


Leon пишет:

 цитата:
При таких наказаниях понятно, почему никто из капитанов не пришёл на выручку де Грассу.Они свой риск соизмеряли



В 1782 (Доменика) Бугенвиль фактически бежал, только Водрёй пытался помочь де Грассу. В итоге его до 1789 г. так и произвели в генерал-лейтенанты. На суде 1784 г. получил "порицание".

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 230
Зарегистрирован: 13.03.08
Откуда: Deutschland, Wiesbaden
Репутация: 0
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 19.01.09 13:23. Заголовок: Эд пишет: В 1782 (Д..


Эд пишет:

 цитата:
В 1782 (Доменика) Бугенвиль фактически бежал, только Водрёй пытался помочь де Грассу. В итоге его до 1789 г. так и произвели в генерал-лейтенанты



Если это о Бугенвиле, вы наверное хотели сказать "не произвели"? Интересно, что наиболее бездарно в этом бою действовал самый опытный моряк Франции. Единственный на тот момент имевший за плечами кругосветное плавание. Что же было ждать от остальных?
Получил ли Водрёй повышение после Ле-Сентс? Как сложилась его судьба при революции.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
постоянный участник


Сообщение: 573
Зарегистрирован: 13.11.07
Репутация: 1
ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 19.01.09 18:30. Заголовок: Leon пишет: Получил..


Leon пишет:

 цитата:
Получил ли Водрёй повышение после Ле-Сентс? Как сложилась его судьба при революции.



Да, Бугенвилля не произвели.
После Доменики маркиз Водрёй-старший (1724-1802) (еще был его мл. брат граф, также участвовавший в кампаниях в Вест-Инди) стал главкомом в Вест-Индии, действовал довольно успешно, 12.08.1782 - ген.-лет, 1784 - нач. флотских экипажей, эмигрировал в 1791, вернулся в 1799.

Спасибо: 0 
ПрофильЦитата Ответить
Ответов - 26 , стр: 1 2 All [только новые]
Ответ:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
большой шрифт малый шрифт надстрочный подстрочный заголовок большой заголовок видео с youtube.com картинка из интернета картинка с компьютера ссылка файл с компьютера русская клавиатура транслитератор  цитата  кавычки моноширинный шрифт моноширинный шрифт горизонтальная линия отступ точка LI бегущая строка оффтопик свернутый текст

показывать это сообщение только модераторам
не делать ссылки активными
Имя, пароль:      зарегистрироваться    
Тему читают:
- участник сейчас на форуме
- участник вне форума
Все даты в формате GMT  3 час. Хитов сегодня: 4
Права: смайлы да, картинки да, шрифты да, голосования нет
аватары да, автозамена ссылок вкл, премодерация откл, правка нет